Broad roads in a thin country - infrastructure concessions in Chile by Hinojosa, Sergio & Gomez-Lobo, Andres
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2279
Broad Roads  Lessons  learned  from Chile's
highly successful  experience
in a Thin Country  in introducing private capital
into the transport






















































































































dPoiLicY RESEARCH  WORKING PAPER 2279
Summary findings
To increase investment in infrastructure,  in the early  Allow downward toll flexibility so that the
1990s Chile's government introduced private capital into  concessionaire can react to unexpectedly low traffic
the transport infrastructure sector, covering roads and  flows, especially for certain types of vehicles.
highways, bridges, tunnels, and airports. The chosen  - Pay special attention to the tendering mechanism
mechanism: a concession scheme through which private  and to the general incentive structure. There are limit
firms would finance and build a given project and then  the pure least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auctio
operate the infrastructure for a set number of years,  but income guarantees do enhance liquidity. In fact, a
recovering their investment by collecting tolls from users.  minimum-income guarantee through an LPVR auction
Among lessons learned from the experience:  an instrument for credit enhancement, not income
* As nmuch  as possible, avoid concessioning roads for  support. Alternatively, some form of financial innovati
which there are convenient alternative freeways nearby.  should be encouraged to make debt service commitme.
Choose the right variable for awarding a concession.  imore flexible.
Avoid mechanisms that (by promoting large payments to  2  If concessions are tendered by traditional method!
the state or short-term concession periods) encourage  and income guarantees will be given, cover only a
high tolls, and if you choose to award a concession to the  fraction of the concessionaire's expected income strear
firm charging the lowest tolls, place a floor and ceiling  to reduce the state's financial exposure and to improve
on possible bids. The floor is to guarantee the  the incentives to the concessionaire.
concession's financial viability; the ceiling is to prevent  * Make the contracts as complete as possible but
inefficient traffic diversions. Ties at either end should be  allow for later modifications or renegotiations, and
resolved by a second variable, such as the level pf  include a well-designed dispute resolution mechanism.
transfers between the state and the firm.
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Chile has experienced  rapid economic  growth  for more  than a decade.  Demand  for basic  infrastructure
services  has grown in tandem with the economic  expansion,  quickly  outstripping  the supply  capacity
of existing  assets.  As a result, important  infrastructure  deficits  have appeared.  If not eliminated,  these
deficits  could  create  serious  bottlenecks  that  could  hamper  further  economic  growth  in the future.
Besides  being a potential  obstacle  to growth, deficits  in basic infrastructure  may also lead to greater
economic  and social inequality.  Lack of infrastructure  may leave  certain  segments  of the population
isolated  and unable  to enjoy  the benefits  that  economic  development  brings  to the rest of society.
The need to increase  investment  in infrastructure  was recognised  early on this decade. However,  the
required  resources-if they were to come from the public purse-would  naturally  crowd out other
public expenditure  programmes,  especially  social welfare spending.  Therefore,  in the early 90's a
policy  decision  was taken to introduce  private  capital in the transport  infrastructure  sector, covering
roads and highways,  bridges,  tunnels  and airports.  The chosen  mechanism  was a concession  scheme,
whereby  a private  firm  would  finance  and build  a given  project  and then operate  the infrastructure  for
a set number  of years.  The concessionaire  would  recover  its investment  by the collection  of tolls from
users.
The concession  programme would thus alleviate the budgetary restrictions of the government,
allowing  more  public  resources  to be devoted  to social spending.  However,  introducing  private  capital
in the infrastructure  sector does not eliminate  the need for government  intervention.  As will be
discussed  below,  there is an important  role for the State  to design,  monitor  and regulate  the contracts
for the duration of the concessions.  In Chile, these activities  have been the responsibility  of the
Ministry  of Public  Works  (MOP).
The purpose  of this paper is to review  the Chilean  private infrastructure  programme  and to present
some lessons  for other countries embarking  on a similar route. The focus is mainly on roads and
highways,  although  a tunnel  and some  airport  facilities  have  also  been concessioned.
The Chilean  experience  is interesting  for several  reasons. First, for its size and scope. Over 2,000
kilometres  of roads have been concessioned  for a value of US$3.3 billion. If airport projects are
considered,  the value of the total infrastructure  concessioned  is over US$3.6  billion. Furthennore,
the programme  will generate,  in present  value terms, net revenues amounting  to between'US$130
million to US$150 million for government  coffers. These figures ignore, however, the potential
liabilities  assumed  by the State  in relation  to the granting  of minimum  income  guarantees.
Second, unlike the experience in Mexico, the programme in Chile has been mostly successful.
Although  it is too early  to know for sure,  the projects  that are already  in service  have  not confronted
any major setbacks  in terms of traffic levels, construction  delays, cost overruns  or other problems.
This is not to say that problems  have not been encountered.  In fact, government  minimum  income
guarantees  for low traffic levels have been triggered in the case of one concession.  In other cases,
Iconflicts have arisen regarding compensations for geological costs and expropriation delays, ex-post
changes to projects, and excessive govemment demands for additional investments. The tendering
of one recent concession failed to attract bidders. However, for the most part these problems have
been successfully dealt with by the mechanisms established in  the concession contracts and  the
concessions law, and have not stalled nor compromised the concession programme as a whole.
Even in early 1999, in spite of the international financial turmoil, one consortium was able to place
dollar denominated bonds in the North American market for a nominal value of US$213 million.
Also, in  1999, another company issued peso inflation linked bonds equivalent to US$150 in the
domestic pensions fund market. These figures imply that the programme still generates confidenc,;e
among investors.
Part of this  success may be  due  to  the  stable macroeconomic situation  of the  last few years.'
However, it is fair to say that part of the success of the programme is also due to its design and
implementation which, it may be added, benefited from the lessons learned from Mexico and other
international experiences.
Third, the programme has been the motivation and testing ground for some interesting innovatiolns
in tendering mechanisms used to award projects. These innovations may help overcome some of tlhe
problems that have plagued road concessions around the world. A case in point is the Least Present
Value of Revenue (LPVR) auction developed by three Chilean academics originally contracted by
the Ministry of Public Works. 2 The properties of the LPVR auction-as  well as the experience frcm
its use in the tendering of two concessions-will  be described in greater detail below.
Other innovations include the use of a multi-variable tendering procedure to  reduce the perverse
incentives that lead to bidders presenting unrealistically low bids in the hope of winning and then
renegotiating the concession contract ex-post. Also, the design of an exchange rate guarantee using
the logic of the LPVR auction in one recent concession may be of interest to other countries.
The paper is organised as follows. First, some background information concerning the magnitude of
the infrastructure deficit is presented. It shows the urgency that confronted the Chilean authorities to
increase infrastructure investment, which  eventually led to  the implementation of the concession
programme. Second, a description of the main characteristics of the Chilean toll road programme is
presented, followed by a summary of the projects tendered so far. The following sections focus on
I Chile  was relatively  unaffected  by the regional  crisis sparked  by the financial  troubles in Mexico  in December 1994.
The current year may provide  a more severe test for the concession  programme.  Due to the international  financial  and
economic  situation,  growth  projections  for 1999  have  been drastically  reduced  to between  1-2%.
2 See Engel, Fischer  and Galetovic  (1996, 1997a,  1997b, 1997c,  1997d, 1998)  [from now on EFG] and the discussion
below.  These academics  were originally  hired as consultants  by MOP.  In that role, Alvaro  Gonzalez  from the Ministry
suggested  they study-among  other issues-the  properties  of a least total revenue  tendering  mechanism,  which :.s  a
special case of the LPVR auction that they  later developed. As part of their work for the Ministry-and  later
independently-they were the first to recognise some of the economic problems faced by traditional franchising
methods  and to propose  novel solutions.
2some special issues related to road concessions and its application in Chile. Finally, the paper ends
with some conclusions and lessons that can be extracted from the Chilean experience.
2  Infrastructure  deficit
Between 1980 and 1994 the vehicle stock in Chile increased from 746,782 to  1,499,904. It is now
expected to reach over 2 million vehicles by the year 2000. In Santiago, the number of vehicles per
capita almost doubled in less than two decades (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Average number of vehicles per thousand residents, Greater Santiago




Source:  Trip Origin  and Destination  Survey,  1991.  The 1995  figure is an estimate  by the Ministry  of Public  Works.
The problems created by the increase in the vehicle stock were compounded by the poor condition of
the road network. During the eighties, maintenance investment reached only  30% of the amount
required. The portion allocated to the paved network was even lower. Estimates showed that by the
middle of the decade close to 50% of the road network was in poor condition (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Conditions of the road network (km)
Good  Fair  Poor  Total
Concrete  1,611  1,726  498  3,835
Asphalt  5,157  2,157  1,802  9,116
Gravel  4,191  22,244  5,803  32,238
Dirt  1,027  15,405  17,802  34,234
Total  11,986  25,905  41,532  79,423
(15%)  (33%/°)  (52%)  (100%)
Source:  Ministry  of Public  Works.
As a consequence of these trends, there has been a marked negative impact on average traffic speeds
and road accident rates. In Santiago, average traffic speeds are almost half of what they were in the late
seventies (Table 2.3). Accident rates in 1996 were more than double their level in 1985 (Table 2.4).
Table 2.3: Average traffic speeds in Greater Santiago





3Source: Ministry of Public Works
Table 2.4: Accidents on Chilean highways





Source: Ministry of Public Works
With respect to airports, the situation was even more dramatic. Economic growth sharply increased
demand for air transport. Passenger traffic, national and international  alike, has grown at rates of up to
20% a year (see Table 2.5). In 1995, the total number of passengers that used airports was 3.5 times
greater than 10 years earlier. This situation has created a high degree of saturation in the use of airport
infrastructure,  requiring urgent expansion in the capacity of most of the country's terminals.
Table 2.5: Air transport traffic, 1991-96
Year  Domestic  passengers  International  Freight
(thousands)  passengers  (tons)
(thousands)
1991  1,856  1,260  126,205
1992  2,428  1,382  134,371
1993  2,990  1,609  144,363
1994  3,569  2,000  180,704
1995  4,024  2,342  188,305
1996  4,750  2,610  204,000
Source: Direcci6n General de AeronAutica  Civil
One  estimate  has  put  the  economic  cost  of  inadequate  infrastructure-including  waste  water
treatment-at  more than US$1.5 billion annually (see Table 2.6).3  In addition, Chile has the strategic
ambition-within  the framework offered by Mercosur-of  becoming the gateway for Latin American
trade with Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. However, this would require an additional
endowment of more than 900 million dollars in infrastructure.
In 1995, MOP estimated that total infrastructure investment needs until the year 2000 would reach
more than US$11 billion (Table 2.7). As a rule of thumb, the international experience indicates that
infrastructure investment should reach between 3.5% and 5.5% of GDP.  In Chile, 3.5% of GDP is
equivalent to around US$1.8 billion. This last figure can be taken as a lower bound on the annual
3 The estimates  presented  in Table 2.6 were determined  by the Chilean  Chamber of Commerce,  which had obvious
vested interests in overstating the existing deficit. Therefore, these figures must be taken with a grain of salt.  However,
most  analysts  would  agree with  the  general  observation  that  there  were  significant  costs  related  to  the  growing
infrastructure deficit at the time.
4investment requirements. However, it is well above the current budgetary capacity of the Ministry of
Public Works, which has an annual budget of close to US$800 million. Although MOP's budget has
been increasing by approximately 10% annually and is expected to continue to rise in the future, an
important part  of  new  resources  will  be  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of  the  already  existing
infrastructure. Without the concession programme it would have been extremely difficult to tackle the
infrastructure  deficit using public funds alone.
Table 2.6: Costs of the infrastructure deficit
Type of loss  Annual loss (US$ million)
Traffic delays  433
Fruit damaged in surface transit  108
Highway delays and vehicle wear  465
Port delays  42
Accident, injuries and damage  130
Gastrointestinal illnesses  106
Other health effects  216
Source: Chilean Chamber of Construction, 1995.
Table 2.7: Infrastructure investment needs, 1995- 2000
Sector  Investment (millions of US$)
Inter-city roads and Highways  4,250
Urban Roads  2,000
Water Treatment  1,480
Potable Water Supply  950
Equipment  810
Sea Ports  450
Railroads  470
Irrigation  370
Control of Rainwater  195
Airports  100
Total  11,075
Source: Ministry of Public Works
53  Overview  of  the concession  programme
The primary  legal basis for the concessions  is the Concessions  Law (DFL N°164  of 1991),  although
the tendering documents,  and other laws and decrees, are also important elements of the legal
framework.
3.1  Tendering  procedures
There are several  stages  in the tendering  process.  First, the project must be defined. Prior to 1994,
projects  were tendered  without full engineering  studies  and technical  designs.  Bidders  were required
to undertake these studies as part of their technical proposals. This approach has the virtue of
speed-government  delays over the  preparation of studies did not hold back the  concession
programme-and  may create an opportunity  for private firms to  be innovative in  designs and
technical  solutions.  However,  it has the drawback  that bidders  must invest a considerable  amount of
resources  in preparing  their bids. Besides  the social waste created  by the duplication  of studies,  the
high cost involved  reduces  the number  of firms  that participate  in each  tendering  process.
Furthermore,  it has now become  evident  that tendering  projects without  thorough  preparation  is an
invitation  to future conflicts,  both with the concessionaire  as well as the affected  community.  Many
additional  investments  and design  changes  have been required  in these earlier  projects as a result of
insufficient  design  preparation  and lack of consultation.
In an effort to induce  more competition  and reduce  the probability  of ex-post  conflicts, since 1994
each concession  has been tendered with detailed design and engineering  studies.  Besides reducing
the ambiguities  related  to the project  definition,  these studies  allow  MOP to estimate  the investment,
maintenance  and operation  costs of the project.  The resulting  'Official Cost Estimate' is included  in
the bidding documents  and is a crucial  parameter  for determining  several variables  of the contract.
However, it  must be  emphasised that the  real ex-post cost of  the  project is  borne by  the
concessionaire  and may well differ from this official ex-ante estimate. Except for expropriation
delays and-in  the case of a tunnel concession-geological risk, the concessionaire  bears the fill
construction  cost risk.
Projects can also be proposed by the private sector. An interested  party can present the relevant
studies  to MOP, who then evaluates  the social convenience  of the project.  If the Ministry  agrees to
tender a concession,  the firm that originated  the project is given an advantage  in the bid evaluation
stage.  Alternatively,  MOP may compensate  the firm for the costs of the studies undertaken.  To date,
one concession-the  access road to  Santiago's international airport-was  an  idea originally
formulated  by the private sector.
Once the project is defined, a pre-qualifying  round for bidders is held to screen for financial  and
technical  capacity.  The authorities  actively  encourage  the participation  of foreign  as well as domestic
firms.  Tenders  are  then  requested  from pre-qualified  firms.
6Tenders must include a technical as well as an economic bid. Technical Bids are opened first and
evaluated by the Technical Bid Evaluation Commission. This commission disqualifies those bids not
satisfying the minimum technical requirements established in  the tendering documents. After the
Evaluation Commission announces the results of the technical round, it opens the Economic Bids of
those firms that were successful in passing the technical stage. The concession is awarded  to the bidder
who tenders the most advantageous Economic Offer, in accordance with criteria set forth in the tender
documents.
The winning consortium must form a company whose sole purpose is to  construct and operate the
concession. This company can only operate one concession, and its exclusive economic activity must
be the concession. If a consortium wins more than one project, it must create several concession
companies. As will be seen further below, isolating the concession firm in this way can be useful to
avoid certain problems that can sometimes plague the bidding process for a franchise. It is also a pre-
requisite for project finance or security purposes.
There are restrictions on the capital structure of the concession companies. Sponsors (the members of
the consortium) must provide for the equity capital of the concession company for an amount equal to
at least 30% of the estimated official cost of the project. The rest can be credits provided by domestic
as well as international  financial institutions.
On average, the duration of the initial design and awarding stage has been 16 months (Coordinacion
General de Concesiones, 1998).
3.2  Tendering variables
The potential variables that determine the Economic Offer, which are used to award the concession,
can be any one or combination of the following variables:
*  Tariff level;
*  Subsidy required from the State;
*  Duration of the concession;
*  Income guarantee  requested from the State;
•  Revenue offered to the State for existing infrastructure;
*  Total income from the concession;
*  Degree of risk commitment that the bidder assumes during the construction stage;
*  Quality of the technical offer;
*  Revenues offered to the State, or reductions in tariffs offered to users, when the profits of
the concessionaire reach a pre-established level;
The first concession to be tendered (El Melon Tunnel) was awarded using a weighted average of seven
variables, including the toll level and payments offered to the State. In the end, these last two variables
were the crucial factors in determining the outcome of the bidding process. The winning consortium
7offered a high toll level (set at the upper bound of the allowed range) and a high payment to the
government. With hindsight, there is little doubt that this tendering mechanism was not appropriate.'
Besides the complexity of this scheme, 5 the resulting high tolls generated an important traffic diversion
to the free alternative road over the mountain where the tunnel was situated. This served to lower the
revenues of the concessionaire and resulted in an inefficient allocation of traffic between the tunnel
and the mountain road.
The concessionaire has subsequently lowered tolls in order to increase traffic through the tunne[.
However, to date, traffic allocation is still inefficient and negotiations are currently underway to reduce
payments to the State in exchange for even lower tolls.
In some respects, the situation of the El Melon Tunnel is similar to the predicament of some Mexican
toll roads 6. In that country, projects were tendered based on the shortest concession duration offered by
firms. For a given traffic flow, the shorter the concession duration, the higher tolls had to be set in
order to finance the projects. However, the resulting high tolls produced important traffic diversions,
aggravated by the fact that in Mexico alternative freeways to each concession were mandatory. This
was one of the main causes behind the low financial performances of some Mexican concessions and
the subsequent government bailout (G6mez-Ibafiez  (1999)).
After the El Melon Tunnel, the tendering mechanism for subsequent concessions was changed. It is
now based on a lexicographic scheme whereby bidders first compete based on the lowest toll offered.
However, tolls are restricted to within a band set by MOP. This band is set with reference to the
possible impacts of toll levels on traffic diversion, the economy of the project and-in  the case of the
main  Pan  American  highway  (Route  5)  concessions-the  level  of  tolls  in  adjacent  concession
segments.
Ties at the floor or ceiling of the allowed band are resolved based on a second variable. In some early
cases, this second variable was the length of the concession. Table 3.1 presents the example of the
economic bids for the Route 5 Santiago-Los Vilos concession. The minimum tariff that could be
offered was  $1,000 (expressed in  pesos  of December  1994). Since two  companies  offered this
minimum toll, the competition continued based on the duration of the concession. Trinela Ruta 5 won
with an offer of 276 months. Had there been no tie for the toll level, the duration offered would have
been irrelevant.
4  See EFG (1996, 1997a).  At the time, MOP  expected  the tunnel  to be unprofitable  at the maximum  tariff level and so
was expecting that the project would be awarded to the firm that solicited the lowest subsidy. As it turned out,
subsidies  were negative.  That is, the winning  firm offered  to transfer  resources  to the government  rather  than the other
way around.
' EFG  (1996, 1997a,  1997c)  have stressed  the importance  of having simple  tendering  mechanisms.  Otherwise,  bidders
may face difficulties  in preparing  reasonable  bids, increasing  the likelihood  of mistakes  in their offers. Complexity  also
increases  the possibility  of ambiguities  in the tendering documents,  the possibility  of discretion on the part of the
regulator  or opportunistic  behaviour  on the part of concessionaire.  These effects increase  the likelihood  of contract
renegotiation.
6  a review  of the Mexican  experience  see G6mez-Ibafnez  (1999).
8Table 3.1 Bids for the Santiago-Los Vilos concession
Consortium  Toll offer expressed in pesos  Duration of the concession
of 12/94  offered (months)
Trinela  Ruta  5  1,000  276
Ica-Tecsa  1,044  300
Infraestructura  2000 S.A.  1,074  300
Consorcio  Obras  Viales  1,000  285
Source:  MOP.
The advantage of this scheme is that it gives MOP more control to set tolls. Therefore, potential
inefficient traffic diversions associated with high levels of this variable are avoided. Conversely, low
toll levels may also be undesirable if there are congestion problems on the highway.
3.2.1  Tendering  mechanism  and  the financial  viability  of the concessions
As the programme continued, the authorities became concerned about the financial viability of firms
that bid too low (that is the minimum tariff and a short concession period). Calculations by MOP
showed that the winning bids in several concessions implied a high risk of future financial instability
for the franchise holder.
There are several reasons why firms may pursue such an apparent loss-making strategy. First, when
several projects are going to be concessioned, firms may be interested in giving a signal of low cost or
aggressive behaviour to other bidders in order to discourage some competitors from participating in
future contests.
Second, when construction firms are the principal consortium partner, the chief interest in the project
may derive from  the ensuing  construction contracts rather than the  subsequent operation of the
concession.! In this context, they may bid below costs in order to secure the construction contracts,
disregarding the long-term financial viability of the concession, possibly because they can later pass on
these costs to other consortium partner or creditors.
Third, firms may behave opportunistically. They bid low, and once they win the franchise, pressure
the regulator to  renegotiate  the conditions of the contract. This strategy  would not  work if the
government  could  commit  to  not  renegotiate  ex-post.  However,  this  is  nearly  impossible  for
governments to do. If the concession runs into financial problems in the future due, for example, to
low revenue flows, the government will find it difficult to let the concession fail. There are political
problems associated with this  event, and there are also the costs and  delays in re-tendering the
project. Therefore, bidding low and renegotiating afterwards may be a viable strategy for a potential
concessionaire (a phenomenon called "low balling").
7 The issue of the potential  perverse incentives  of construction  companies  in road concessions  is not well explored  in
the literature  but some analysts mention this as a problem in several toll road programmes,  including  France and
Mexico  (see Gomez-lbafiez  and Meyer  (1993) and  Gomez-lbafiez  (1999)).
9Finally,  one  cannot rule  out  optimisation mistakes on  the  part  of  bidders,  possibly  related to
uncertainty (winner's curse), or the complexity of tendering mechanisms.'
Whatever the underlying cause, from a social point of view, low-bids that risk the financial stability
of the concession should be avoided. Otherwise, the competitive bidding process does not guarantee
that the most efficient firm wins the franchise. In addition, if subsequent financial distress forces a
re-negotiation, the ex-post economic conditions of the concession (tolls, subsidies, etc.) may not be
as beneficial  to  society  as they  could be.  Furthermore,  the  fact that  a  government  is  seen  to
renegotiate contracts may be a very dangerous signal to give to future bidders.
As a reaction to the low bidding problem, MOP changed the tendering mechanism slightly, starling
with the Route 5 Temuco-Rio Bueno project. This change may prove to be an effective methocl of
avoiding the negative effects of unrealistic bids. The method works as follows (see Figure 3.1). The
toll band is set as before. The floor of the ban is set sufficiently high to guarantee a certain revenue
stream to the concessionaire. In addition, the duration of the contract is also fixed in the tendering
documents.
Recalling that the concession company is a single-purpose firm that has to be capitalised by the
sponsoring firms, setting this minimum toll level and the duration of the contract effectively puts a
floor on the expected earnings of the company. Therefore, the risk of future financial distress for the
concession firm-which  would force the govemment to renegotiate the contract-is  minimised.
What happens if two  or more firms bid  the minimum value?  Then the winner is chosen  as the
consortium of sponsors that offers the highest transfer directly to the government.  Because this
transfer does not affect the income or capital structure of the concession firm, sponsors can bid1  as
much as they like without jeopardising the financial stability of the concession. If investors make a
mistake and bid too much, the consequent loss will show up in the sponsor's financial returns, not
the concession company.
In  effect,  this  bidding mechanism  significantly reduced the  chances  of re-negotiation,  without
lowering the  competitive pressure  of the  process. It  is  possible  that  sponsors  may  still  trr  to
renegotiate the contract ex-post, but they will not have one of their main bargaining chips at their
disposal; namely, that the concession firm is effectively in financial distress. 9 It is  unlikely that
governmrents will  feel  pressured  to  renegotiate  because  the  financial  results  of  the  (possibly
international) sponsors are negative. If the concession firm is in good shape, and there are no risks
8 EFG were the first  to raise  the issue  of 'low balling'  in the context of the Chilean  road  programme,  as well as possible
optimisation  errors,  winner's curse  problems  and other issues  covered  in this section,  especially  the socially  detrimental
effects of contract  re-negotiation.  However,  the mechanism  devised  to overcome  the problems  resulting  from low  bids
is due to MOP.
9 Engel, Fisher  and Galetovic  in several  of their articles  point  out that  the LPVR  auction  may also reduce  the occurrence
of low-balling.  Their argument  rests on the assumption  that the LPVR  bid of the winning  firm offers  the governmrent  a
credible threat to terminate  the concession  quickly and compensate  the firm if it tries to renegotiate.  This will be
discussed  further  below  in relation  to the LPVR  auction  mechanism.
10of disruption to  its  activities due to  financial distress, governments should be  able to  resist re-
negotiation pressures better.
This transfer mechanism from sponsors has served to generate close to US$150 million in the 4
concessions where it has been used. The proceeds are deposited in an Infrastructure Fund which is
then used to cross-subsidise other projects or pay for minimum income guarantees.
Figure 3.1 Bidding mechanism to avoid 'low-balling'
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3.2.2  Subsidies and transfers in projects
The govemmrent  has offered direct subsidies on several occasions. These are used to fund projects that
are not privately profitable at reasonable toll levels, or to equilibrate tolls along adjacent segments of
road (as in the Route 5 concessions). The yearly value of subsidies is known and included in the
tendering documents. In other cases, when concessions are very profitable, it is the firm that must
make transfers to the State. These values are also included in the bidding documents.
In essence, MOP has taken the view of dissociating toll settings frorn the financial requirements of the
concessionaires. Tolls are set according to traffic allocation criteria. Transfers and subsidies are then
used to guarantee the financial equilibrium of the firrn. This policy makes economic sense. If tolls are
set exclusively to cover investment, maintenance and operating costs, then high tolls result when low
traffic volumes are expected and low tolls result in high traffic and congested conditions. Exactly the
opposite of what economic rationale would dictate for a pricing signal (Tirole (1997)).
11It is important to note that these transfers and subsidies are different from the transfers and subsidies
described earlier in relation to the tendering mechanism. Whereas the transfers/subsidies described in
this  section are yearly values that accrue to  the concession company,  and are known before the
tendering of the project, the transfers described in the previous section are payments from sponsors
that do not affect the concession company. It is possible (and has happened on one occasion) that a
project receives a subsidy from the State, but due to a tie in the bidding stage, the concession is
awarded according to a transfer from sponsors to the State.
3.2.3  Least  Present  Value  of Revenue  tendering  mechanism
Finally, two projects (one unsuccessfully) have been tendered using a Least Present Value of Revenue
mechanism. These will be described in greater detail below.
3.3  Construction  and  operation  stage
Once the project has been awarded and the relevant documents signed and formalised, the construction
stage begins. The concessionaire must post a guarantee bond at the beginning of this stage, which the
government can make effective if the conditions of the contract are not met. The value of the initial
bond is set in the tendering document, but usually varies between 2%-5% of the official cost estimate
for each project. Once a significant amount of the construction has been undertaken (usually 40%), the
value of the guarantee bond is lowered.
Right of way acquisitions are paid for by the concessionaire. The estimated value of these acquisitions
is  set  in  the  bidding documents. Delays  and  cost  over-run  risks are  borne  by  the  State. The
concessionaire is compensated for delays by a matching extension in the duration of the concession.
There is also a compensation for the extra construction costs borne by the concessionaire as a result of
delays in land expropriations (idle machinery, fixed costs, etc.). If right of way acquisitions turn out to
be more expensive than originally planned, the State must provide the extra resources.
Right of way acquisition delays and cost over-runs have been the norm in the Chilean (as well as miost
other) concession programmes. Some practical difficulties have also been encountered in estimating
the fair compensation that should be given to the concessionaire for the added construction costs due
to these delays.
Once the infrastructure is in operation, the concessionaire must replace the construction guarantee
bond with an operation guarantee bond, which must be valid (or periodically renewed) until one year
after the  concession ends.  The value  of the  operational guarantee is  in  the  same range  as the
construction guarantee.
Besides  these  guarantees,  the  concessionaire  is  subject  to  numerous  other  penalties  and
fines-including  the  possible  termination  of  the  concession-for  failures  to  meet  the  safety,
operational and quality standards set in the contract. A list of the faults that the concessionaire may
incur and the corresponding  financial penalties are set out in the bidding documents.
123.4  Toll indexing  and  safety  premium
Tolls are differentiated by type of vehicle. The concessionaire is free to lower tolls provided that he
does not price discriminate against users in the same category. The categories are:
*  motorcycles;
*  cars, vans and pick-up trucks;
*  cars, vans and pick-up trucks with attachments;
*  2 axle buses;
*  2 axle trucks;
*  buses with more than 2 axles;
*  trucks with more than 2 axles.
Tolls are correspondingly higher for vehicles with 2 or more axles. Two axle vehicles pay a maximum
of 1.8 times the normal car toll, while larger vehicles pay 3.2 times. Under certain conditions, namely
when traffic diversion is not a problem, this charging structure is appropriate for an efficient pricing
structure since it is well known that the deterioration of a highway is exponentially (to the 4t power)
related to axle weight." 0 However, differentiating tolls by vehicle type may increase tolling costs for
the operator. Furthermore, it imposes an additional monitoring burden on the regulator."
Tolls are adjusted yearly  for  inflation or when  accumulated monthly  inflation surpasses a  pre-
established level, usually 15%. There is also a premium tariff increase for the concessionaire when
road safety improves. Many concessions also have a peak pricing mechanism whereby tariffs are
raised during peak demand periods.
3.5  Duration  of the concession  and  the subsequent  transfer  to public  operation
The concession period varies from project to project. Some-in  particular the airport infrastructure
concessions-can  be as short as 10 to 12 years (including the construction stage). The usual duration
of the major highway concessions is 22 to 25 years, with the longest being 28 years (including the
construction stage).
Not all concessions have a fixed period duration. In early 1998 the Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifia  del Mar
inter-city highway  project  (Route 68)  was  tendered  using the  Least  Present  Value of  Revenue
10 This is based on the research  of the American Association  of State Highway Officials  (AASHO).  See Armitage
(1980) for a useful  discussion  of the AASHO  results.
"  In contrast,  in the United Kingdom  toll roads programme  vehicles are differentiated  into two categories  based on
length. However,  in this case, the use of shadow  tolls instead of real tolls allows the use of simple and inexpensive
traffic counting  machines.  These can only reliably  differentiate  vehicles  by length.  For a recount of the UK toll road
experience  see Highways  Agency  and Private  Finance  Panel (1997).
13auction. 1 2 The bidder who  offered the  lowest revenue  (in  present value terms) in  exchange for
constructing, operating and maintaining the infrastructure won the competition. Initial tariffs were set
in the contract and can later be modified by the government.  The concession will terminate when
enough traffic has used the infrastructure so that the concessionaire has received the revenue presented
in his  Economic Offer. Therefore, the exact month when the concession will end  is uncertain." 3
Furthermore, the government has the option, after 12 years, of termninating  the concession early and
compensating the concessionaire according to a pre-established formula.
Another concession was recently tendered using the Least Present Value of-Revenue  mechanism
(Costanera Norte). Unfortunately, only one bid was received for this project and it did not meet the
conditions stipulated in the bidding documents. Consequently, this project was not awarded. In spite of
this setback, it is probable that in the future, more projects will be tendered using this mechanism, so
an increasing proportion of the concessions in Chile will be of variable length.
At the end of the concession period, the infrastructure reverts to public operation. An important issue
arises at this stage with respect to the quality of the infrastructure. Although the operator has the
obligation to maintain the infrastructure in good quality for the duration of the concession period, it is
natural that towards the end of the concession the incentives for such additional expenditures and
investments are blunted. Therefore, safeguards must  be  put  in  place  in  the contract in  order to
guarantee  that the infrastructure will revert to the State in good condition.
In Chile this safeguard consists of an additional bond posted two years before the concession ends
(that must be valid for at least three years). The value of this bond is similar to, and additional, to the
operation stage bond already posted. Furthermore, at least one year before the concession ends, the
Fiscal Inspector (the government's representative who monitors and oversee the concession) conducts
an audit. He then presents the concessionaire with a list of maintenance and repair work that needs to
be undertaken in order for the infrastructure  to revert to public operation in the conditions established
in the contract.
3.6  Tolls  in Chile:  a socially  acceptable  tradition
The concessionaire recoups his investment primarily through the income provided by tolls to users.
However, as already mentioned, in some concessions these tolls are insufficient to cover the required
investment and are complemented by direct subsidies from the State. In other cases, toll income more
than suffices to finance the project and the concessionaire must make a payment to the State. When
applicable, the amounts of these transfers are set before the bidding stage.
Unlike other countries, in  Chile,  alternative freeways are not required  for toll roads to  be  built
and-for  the most part-existing  projects do not have convenient free alternative routes. There are
12 The properties  of the LPVR auction and a detailed  description  of its use in the Santiago-Valparaiso-Vinia  del Mar
concession  is presented  below.
3 However,  there is a maximum  limit  of 25 years to the concession.
14historical reasons why this was possible. The first toll in Chile was built in 1963. Since then, more
than a dozen tolls in the public highway system have been built and operated by MOP. Therefore,
users are already accustomed to  being charged for the use of certain highways. There is a social
acceptance of these arrangements due to historical tradition.
Furthermore, many of the concession projects have been extensions and improvements to currently
tolled roads. The tendering process has also served to lower some toll levels." 4 Therefore, users not
only see an improvement in the infrastructure as a result of the concession programme, but in certain
cases a decrease in the level of tolls too. In the case of previously untolled roads, users can compare
the new charges with the traditional tolled public roads. This comparison shows that tolls are lower in
the private sector as compared to the public sector, an indication of the competitive benefits of the
franchising process. These reasons may explain in part why public opposition to a private toll road
programme without freeway alternatives has been minimal in Chile.
That is not to say that there have been no legal challenges to the policy. The legal arguments are based
on two rights guaranteed by the Constitution: the right to free movement within the national territory
and the right to the use of private property. The first right may be considered violated when there is a
tolled route without free alternatives. The second right may be limited when the only access to a
certain property is by means of a toll road.
In this  respect, it is interesting to  examine the results of a  legal report from  March  1994.15  The
generality of the arguments make them relevant to other countries.
Regarding the principle of free transit, the report asserts that a toll only  affects the cost, not the
liberty to exercise the right to movement within the national territory. A fare or toll, as such, is only
one component of the total cost  of transport in motorised vehicles, just  as fuel taxes or licences
would be (to mention other costs of which the State is the beneficiary). The Constitution does not
assure the right to gratuitously exercise the rights that are guaranteed. Therefore, no conflict was
found between the right to free movement and the establishment of tolls without free alternatives.
In addition, it is not clear that a toll to fund a better, faster and safer road increases the overall cost
of a trip.  Savings in time,  maintenance and  accidents may well compensate for the extra costs
imposed by the charge.
Regarding property rights, the Constitution  also states that the law can establish limitations  and
obligations on property rights when this is in the general interests of the nation, national security,
public health or the environment. Thus, a toll can be interpreted as an obligation allowed for by law,
which affects those who travel by road, for the general interest and collective social good of having
an appropriate road infrastructure.
14 Individual  tolls are lower  in the private  sector.  However,  since  there will be more  tolls  than before,  the total toll costs
borne  by users  will depend  on the origin-destination  characteristics  of trips.
5 Judicial  report  by Attorney  Monica  Madariaga,  commissioned  by MOP
153.7  Minimum income guarantees
All  but  one  concession contract tendered  so  far  provides a  minimum  income  guarantee to  the
concessionaire.  This guarantee was introduced so that investors could secure the needed finance for the
projects. Because of its  importance to the concession programme, its  fiscal implications, and the
criticism it has received from various analysts, details of the guarantee mechanism are relegated to a
special section below.
3.8  Extension or changes to existing contracts'6
A concession contract must strike a balance between being credible, and thus providing potential
operators with the security that they will not be 'expropriated' of their investment in the future, and
being flexible, by allowing the concession to be modified if new and unexpected circumstances arise.
A particular situation where this is important is the treatment of additions or modifications to a project
once it had been awarded. It may become apparent ex-post that due to an  initially faulty design.
unaccounted for social impacts, or other unexpected circumstances, it might be socially desirable to
modify or extend the infrastructure from what was originally contained in the concession contract.
A substantial number of contracts have been subject to ex-post complementary negotiations due to the
need to change the original design or to provide for additional investments. One important cause of
this has been the ex-post revelation of the demands of the numerous communities affected by a project
Although community participation-in  the form of public meetings-and  social, environmental and
geographic impact assessments are routinely undertaken by MOP in the project design stage, it is
never possible to predict the myriad of effects that a particular project may impose on neighbouring
communities. Issues such as  the placement of  bus stops, pedestrian crossings, resistance to  lancL
expropriations and the effects of a project on the dynamics between hub and satellite towns and cities
are very  difficult to  consider completely and  satisfactorily at the design  stage. There is  also the
possibility that ex-post the designs are sub-optimal from a technical or safety perspective.
One recommendation derived from the Chilean experience is that consultations and agreements with
the affected communities are crucial and should be undertaken thoroughly before projects are tendered.
This has been a 'learning by doing'  process. MOP now tries to reach protocol agreements with the
relevant  local  governments before  projects  are tendered.  Another  recommendation is  that  land
expropriation procedures should be undertaken as early as possible, and ideally before projects are
tendered.
However, it is inevitable that some issues will still arise after a contract has been tendered and pressure
will be placed on the authorities to change or expand projects. If these issues present legitimate social
concerns-as  opposed  to  financial bailouts  to  the  concessionaire-then  it  may  be  desirable to
renegotiate the contract. In this case, it is better to have a framework for dealing with subsequent
16 This section and the next are partly based on Jiles (1998).
16negotiations rather than relying on ad-hoc procedures as issues arise. Otherwise, the risk perceived by
potential concessionaires increases, as  well as the loss in  transparency and accountability of the
tendering process." 7
In order to provide the needed flexibility without compromising the interests of the concessionaire,
there has been a progressive effort to include detailed procedures for the treatment of additional work
in concession contracts. The government can demand additional work for up to a maximum of 20% of
the initial official cost estimate of the project, and only up to two years before the concession ends. In
the later concessions an additional restriction was added to the contract. It specifies that during the
construction stage, additional work can only be demanded for up to 5% of the official cost estimate.
There are two further issues that need to be considered. First, how should the additional investment be
valued? If the government can impose a low valuation, the concessionaire will suffer an economic
loss. On the other hand, if the concessionaire can negotiate a high valuation of the extra investment, it
will obtain excessive profits to the detriment of the State, and ultimately users or taxpayers. In recent
concessions, any new investment demanded during the construction stage is valued according to a
unitary pricing schedule contained in the tendering documents. Bidders implicitly accept these unitary
costs when they participate in the franchising process. These official costs were introduced in the
contract due to the difficulties encountered during negotiations to change some of the specifications of
the initial concessions. In these earlier cases, bidders had to present detailed budgets for the project,
including  unit prices for  all  items." 8 However,  since the  project  was  awarded according to  the
Economic Offers-which  were not required to be consistent with the investment budgets-  bidders
did not have an incentive to reveal their true costs.' 9
The construction phase lasts no more than a few years and therefore it may be reasonable to set unitary
prices in the contract, especially when-as  in Chile-they  are indexed for inflation. However, setting
prices far into the future may not be  recommendable. Relative price variations and technological
change will make prices set at the beginning of the concession period increasingly out of line with real
costs. Therefore, the valuation of new investments required during the operational phase must be
agreed between the Ministry of Public Works and the concessionaire. If they do not agree, differences
must be settled by the Conciliatory Commission (described in the next section) based on technical
reports produced by consultants from each party.
The  second  issue  is  how  to  compensate  the  concessionaire  for  the  additional  investments
undertaken. There are several options:
'7  EFG (1996,  1997a) present several  arguments on why re-negotiation  may be  harmful to the  public interest. The
argument here is that these negative impacts are somewhat reduced if renegotiations are conducted within a clear and
pre-established framework.
8 Because MOP did not do the detailed engineering studies in these earlier concessions, it was not possible to have
official unit prices.
'9 In fact, because of the specific revenue sharing scheme included in the early contracts, bidders had an incentive to
overstate their investment budgets.
17*  increase tolls;
*  increase the duration of the concession;
*  direct payments by the State.
The Government and the concessionaire may not agree on the preferred compensation instrument,
especially because of the different timing of cash flows implied by each alternative. Furthermore,
due to the length of the political cycle, a government may have an undue preference for extending
the length of the concession rather than increasing tolls or direct payments to the concessionaire.
These may create an excessive incentive to demand new investments since the current authorities
would enjoy the political  benefits of procuring extra infrastructure today but the costs would be
borne by future users.
In order to avoid conflicts and to reduce the incentive problem mentioned above, the most recent
concessions place  explicit restrictions on the compensation mechanism. For example, in the Rio
Bueno-Puerto Montt concession, tariff increases during the life of the contract cannot exceed 25%
while  the  increase  in  the  duration  of  the  concession  cannot  be  longer  than  120  months. 20
Furthermore, an explicit formula is included in the contract to calculate the required compensation.
This is given by:
X  '  k  =  Ik  +  E  C
i=k+l(l + r)=(l  + r)
where
Ik  =  Additional investment in period k
N = Initial duration of the concession
S =  Extension  of the contract
Y,  Additional income due to the increase in tariffs, where
J  p,P,Q, +G,  t=k+l,.,N
(I +p,)P, Q,+ G,  t=N+l,...,N+S
and
P, = Tolls prior to compensation
Q, = Projected traffic levels associated with the new investment at initial toll levels
p,=  Percentage increase in tolls
G,=  Direct payments by the State
C,=  Operational and maintenance costs associated with the new investment
T,=  Taxes due on the additional toll income
r =  Discount  rate
20 In the case of a variable length concession, such as the Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifia del Mar Highway, these conditions
are correspondingly different.
18The additional operational and maintenance costs, the projected traffic levels and the discount rate
must be based on an expert's report. If disagreements arise over these parameters, the Conciliatory
Commission must be convened. However, the tender documents are usually more explicit on how to
estimate the discount rate and they place an upper limit on the risk premium that the concessionaire
can receive.
In order to avoid imposing additional traffic risks on the concessionaire, there is a payment at the
end of the concession to compensate for the difference between the projected traffic levels used in
the above calculations and the real traffic level observed. This compensation is calculated as:
N+S Y -T  -(fY  T  )  N+S-k
NSi=k+l  (1+r  -
where  the  '^'  symbol  indicates  the  ex-post  real  value  observed  of  the  variable.  There  is  no
compensation,  however,  for  operational  and  maintenance  costs  that  differ  from  the  original
estimates. Otherwise, the concessionaire would have an incentive to  inflate these costs in order to
receive extra compensation at the end of the concession period. However, these costs are usually
small in comparison to investments. Differences between the expert's  estimate used to calculate the
compensation and real ex-post  costs will probably not have a significant affect on the profitability of
the concession.
3.9  Dispute  settlement  mechanisms
As the concession programme has evolved, there has been a progressive effort to reduce contractual
ambiguities and make contracts as complete as possible. The treatment of additional investments
presented above is an example. However, controversies are bound to arise anyway. In the case of
additional investments, for example, there are some parameters which are still left undetermined and
may be the source of future conflicts. In addition, many other issues may lead to controversies.
Therefore, it is important to have an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism. Due to the
costs and time involved, recourse to the judicial system should be the last resort and thus limited to the
most important and acrimonious conflicts.
The main dispute settlement mechanism in the Chilean concessions is the Conciliatory Commission.
This commission has three members, one nominated by the concessionaire, one by the authorities and
the third by mutual accord. Members of the commission must be nominated at the beginning of the
concession before any controversies have arisen. The commission is established when one  of the
parties raises a demand. In the case of the State, contracts stipulate an explicit and limited set of
circumstances whereby it  can raise a  demand to  the Commission. The concessionaire has  more
flexibility in this respect.
19The Commission's initial task is to conciliate the diverging positions. If agreement is not reached, the
concessionaire, and only the concessionaire, has the choice of either taking the matter to the judicial
system  or requesting the  establishment of the Arbitration Commission. This  last Commission is
formed by the same members as the Conciliatory Commission and its decision is binding and not
subject to appeal in the courts.
To date, several Conciliatory Commissions have been established (see Table 3.1). In the case of El
Melon Tunnel, the controversy related to the geological cost over-run guarantee offered by the State in
that concession. In particular, there was a dispute as to the required level of compensation owed to the
concessionaire. The final agreement resulted in a transfer that was an average of the government's and
the concessionaire's position.
Other commissions have been established for the Nogales-Puchuncavi Road, Route 5 Rio Bueno to
Puerto Montt, La Madera Road and the Access Road to the AMB international airport. In this last
case, the controversy is related to the valuation of additional landscaping investments demanded by the
government and the compensation for the modification of parking charges that had to be introduced
after significant protests from airport workers forced the government to change the original charging
policy.
The Chilean dispute settlement mechanism may be improved on several fronts. First, most conflicts
have taken  longer to  resolve than  originally planned, reducing the efficiency of the mechanism.
Establishing time limits for a dispute settlement, or paying commission members a fixed fee rather
than an hourly fee, as is currently done, may help to speed up these processes. Second, concession
contracts do not specify a time limit for raising conflicts to the commission. Therefore, complaints
may be lodged by a concessionaire many months after the occurrence of the offending event, after
which it is nearly impossible for the State to collect the required information to argue its case or to
negotiate a reasonable settlement.
Another  problem relates  to  the transition  from  the  Conciliatory Commission to  the Arbitration
Commission. The members of both of these commissions are the same. Each party to a conflict will
have an opportunity to gauge the commission member's attitudes and opinions regarding the issue
under dispute during the conciliatory stage. This benefits the concessionaire who has the sole right to
decide-if  agreement is not reached during the first stage-whether  to pursue the issue in the judicial
system or through the Arbitration Commission. The concessionaire may then have the incentive to
take the matter to the Courts only when it perceives that the majority of commission members have a
position less favourable to its own and vice versa. Hence, the dispute settlement mechanism may not
be fair to the State.
Finally, the dispute mechanism currently lacks clear rules and procedures for arriving at a settlement.
The outcome of the El Melon Tunnel and the La Madera Road cases point to an 'average' solution to
disputes. If parties anticipate that this will be the case, they have an incentive to exaggerate their ex-
ante position in order to benefit from this  ex-post averaging. This may increase the frequency of
disputes and make them harder to reconcile during the conciliatory stage. Constraining the Arbitration
20Commission to use 'swing arbitration'-where  they have to choose between the positions of one of
the parties but not an intermediate one-may  be recommendable. This is the approach taken in Chile
to deal with price setting disputes in the utility industries.
Table 3.3 Dispute settlement cases and their outcomes
Concession  Problems  Process  Outcome
El Melon Tunnel  Dispute over the interpretation of  Conciliatory  The Commission
the geological risk insurance that  Commission  recommended a US$ 10
was given by the State. The firm  million payment
argues that compensation should be
US$15 million while MOP argues it  The recommendation was
should only be US$ 7 million  accepted by both parties
La Madera Road  Dispute regarding the inclusion or  Conciliatory  The Arbitration
exclusion of 2 kms. of road in the  Commission was unable  Commission determined
concession. MOP argues that the  to produce an  that the 2 km in question
stretch of road is part of the  agreement and the case  are part of the concession
concession and thus the firm is  was taken to the  but MOP must
responsible for its maintenance. The  Arbitration Commission  compensate the firm for
firm argues otherwise.  50% of maintenance and
other costs
Access Road to  Dispute regarding additional  Conciliatory  In process
AMB Airport  landscaping investments demanded  Commission
by the State and the status of
parking charges
Route 5, Rio Bueno  Dispute over a US$ 100,000 fine  Conciliatory  In process
to Puerto Montt  applied to the concessionaire for its  Commission
delay in cancelling an expropriation
payment due to the State
Nogales-  Dispute over the original design of  Conciliatory  In process
Puchuncavi Road  the project and its modifications, a  Commission  was unable
catastrophe insurance claim and  to produce an
cost over-runs in land  agreement and the case
expropriations  was taken to the
Arbitration Commission
4  The concessions  program  to date
The bulk of the concession programme, in terms of investment volumes and kilometres of road, has
been the different segments of the main north-south Pan American highway, Route 5 (see Table 4.1).
Of the 2,052 kilometres awarded so far, 75% corresponds to the Route 5 projects. In value, these
projects account for 70% of the total volume to be invested.
21Table  4.1: Projects  awarded,  1992-1998
Sector  Project  Investment  Length  Year  Year expected to be in  Duration
(US$ millions)  (km)  concession  partial or full operation  (years)
awarded
Inter-city  El Melon Tunnel  42  6  1992  In operation  23
La Madera Road  34  110  1994  In operation  25
North Access to Concepci6n  230  89  1994  In operation  28
Santiago-San Antonio Highway  140  104  1995  In operation  23
Nogales-Puchuncavi Road  12  27  1995  In operation  22
Route 5, Talca-Chillan  183  192  1995  In operation  10
Route 5, Santiago-Los  Vilos  272  218  1996  1999  23
Santiago-Los Andes Highway  146  96  1996  2000  28
Route 5, Los Vilos-La Serena  265  228  1996  2000  25
Route 5, Chillan-Collipulli  224  160  1997  2001  22
Route 5, Temuco-Rio  Bueno  203  172  1997  2001  25
Route 5, Rio Bueno-Puerto Montt  210  136  1997  2001  25
Route 5, Collipulli-Temuco  241  163  1997  2002  25
Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifia  del Mar  400  130  1998  2002  Variable
Highway  length
Route 5, Santiago-Talca  750  266  1998  2002  25
Total  3352  2052
Urban  Access to AMB airport  13  2.2  1995  In operation  12
Total  13  2.2
Airports  Diego Aracena, Iquique  6  ---  1996  In operation  12
El Tepual, Puerto Montt  6  ---  1996  In operation  12
La Florida, La Serena  3  ---  1997  In operation  10
El Loa, Calama  3  ---  1997  1999  12
AMB, Santiago  220  ---  1997  1999  15
_  _  Carriel  Sur, Concepcion  20  ---  1998  2000  16
__________  Total  258  -- _
TOTAL  3610  2054  .
Source: MOP
zzTable 4.2: Project tolls and other relevant parameters, 1992-1998
Sector  Project  Estimated  average  Tolls for cars (US$  Tolls per km.  Transfers to the State (US$  Subsidies from the
daily traffic 1996  at tolls and  (USO/km)  millions)a  State (US$ millions)b
(veh/day)  exchange rate of
12/96)
Inter-city  El Melon Tunnel  6,300  8.37  119.52  4.36 per year
La Madera Road  1,200  4.98  4.15  ---  5.23 total
North Access to Concepci6n  3,000  4.77  6.35
Santiago-San Antonio Highway  6,000  2.21  2.13  20 payments of 6.13
Nogales-Puchuncavi Road  1,000  1.49  5.52  -
Route,  5Talca-Chillan  9000  2.41  2.49  12.45  *(1.05)(T-4)
Route 5, Santiago-Los Vilos  9200  2.74  2.58  10.90 (T=4)
9.34*(1.05)(1-4)  (T>4)
Santiago-Los Andes Highway  5,200  3.56  4.95  0.62*(1.05)( 1-6  )
Route 5, Los Vilos-La Serena  2,500  3.12  2.73  10.90*(105)1  -D5)
Route 5, Chillan-Collipulli  5,900  2.74  3.18  ---  4.67*(1.05)(1-5)
Route 5,  Temuco-Rio BuenoC  3500  2.74  2.75  2.01 (T=5)  7.78*(1.05)  1()
Route 5, Rio Bueno-Puerto MonttC  5,800  2.74  2.28  8.14 (T=5)  9.34*(1.05) (1-I5)
Route 5, Collipulli-Temucod  5,700  2.74  2.89  18.22 (T=5)
3.1 1*(1.05)(T-5)
Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifla  del Mar  12,600  4.27  3.89
Highway
Route 5, Santiago-Talcad  18,000  2.73  2.87  124.5 (T=5)
10.9*(1  .05)(T-5)
Urban  Access to AMB airport  11,700  0.50  29.13
Airports  Diego Aracena, Iquique  1,070  3.41
El Tepual, Puerto Montt  1,006  6.05  ---  ---  ...
La Florida, La Serena  1,478  3.13  ---  .
El Loa, Calama  2,650  5.62  ---  --- ,---
AMB, Santiago  600  1.44  e  ---  ---
Carriel Sur, Concepcion  3,500  7.42 t
Source:  MOP
3 The 'T' in some  of the transfer/subsidy  formulas  stands  for the concession  year.  The transfers  in this column  include  those contained  in the original  tendering  documents  as part of the profitability
enhancement  of the  concession  as originally  designed  by MOP  plus  transfers  as a result  of the  bidding  competition.
The 'T' in some  of the  transfer/subsidy  formulas  stands  for the concession  year.
In this concession,  subsidies  were included  in the bidding  documents.  However,  because  several  firms  presented  an offer  at the minimum  toll level,  the contract  was awarded  to the company  whose
sponsors  offered  the highest  payment  to the State.  Therefore,  this company  has  subsidies  and transfers.  However,  the subsidies  accrue  to the concession  company,  while  the transfers  must be paid by
sponsors  directly.




23Table  4.3: Winning  consortiums  and  partners
Sector  Project  Consortium name  Partners  Origin
Inter-city  El Melon Tunnel  Tunel el Mel6n S.A.  Endesa  Chile
Delta S.A.  Chile
Agroman S.A.  Spain
La Madera Road  Camino de la Madera S.A.  Empresa Constructora Belfi  Chile
Asesoria e Inversiones CMB S.A.  Chile
Las Americas AFI S.A.  Chile
North Access to Concepci6n  Trinela S.A.  Tribasa Chile S.A.  Mexico
Const. de Ingenieria Neut Latour S.A.  Chile
Santiago-San  Antonio  Autopista El Sol S.A.  Endesa S.A.  Chile
Highway  Besalco S.A  Chile
Empresa Const. Fe Grande S.A.  Chile
Larrain Vial S.A.  Chile
Nogales-Puchuncavi Road  Camino Nogales-Puchuncavi S.A  Cruz Blanca S.A.  Chile
Empresa Constr. Delta S.A.  Chile
Route 5, Talca-Chillin  Ruta 5 Tramo Talca Chillin S.A.  Cruz Blanca  Chile
Ferrovial Ltda.  Spain
Route 5, Santiago-Los  Vilos  Tribasa-Inela S.A.  Tribasa Conosur Inela  Mexico
Santiago-Los  Andes  Autopista Los Libertadores S.A.  Inecsa 2000 S.A. [formed by Infraestructura
Highway  2000 y Endesa]  Chile
Ecsa Capitales  Chile
Route 5, Los Vilos-La  Sacyr Chile S.A.  Sacyr Chile S.A.  Spain
Serena
Route 5, Chillin-Collipulli  Tribasa Conosur S.A.  Tribasa  Mexico
Route 5, Temuco-Rio  Ecovias 5 S.A.  Ferrovial Ltda.  Spain
Bueno  Delta S.A.  Chile
CB Infraestructura  Chile
Route 5, Rio Bueno-Puerto  Sacyr Chile S.A.  Sacyr  Spain
Montt
Route 5, Collipulli-Temuco  Favias S.A.  Ferrovial  Spain
Agromar  Spain
Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifia  Rutas del Pacifico S.A.  Sacyr  Spain
del Mar Highway
24Route 5, Santiago-Talca  Autopistas del Maipo S.A.  Ferrovial  Spain
Agroman  Spain
Banco Santander  Spain
Urban  Access to AMB airport  Aerovias S.A.  Ingecol S.A.  Chile
Sica Ltda.  Chile
Airports  Diego Aracena, Iquique  Chucumata S.A.  Empresa Constr. Belfi S.A.  Chile
Lan Chile S.A.  Chile
Deconsa S.A.  Chile
El Tepual, Puerto Montt  Concesionaria El Tepual S.A.  Gesti6n en Ingenieria IDC  Chile
Senexo  Chile
Cosalco  Chile
Inversiones e Inmobiliaria Viento Claro  Chile
Socimer Chile  Chile
La Florida, La Serena  Gesti6n e Ingenieria IDC S.A.  Gesti6n en Ingenieria IDC  Chile
Senexo  Chile
Cosalco  Chile
Inversiones e Inmobiliaria Viento Claro  Chile
El Loa, Calama  Gesti6n e Ingenieria IDC S.A.  Gesti6n en Ingenieria IDC  Chile
Senexo  Chile
Cosalco  Chile
Inversiones e Inmobiliaria Viento Claro  Chile
AMB, Santiago  SCL, Terminal A6reo de Santiago  Agroman  Spain
Aeropuertos de Vancouver  Canada
Carriel Sur, Concepcion  Aero Sur S.A.  Ingecol  Chile
Sica  Chile
Mendez Junior  Brazil
Brundl  Chile
Source: MOP
25As can be seen from Table 4.1, only one concession has a variable duration. As mentioned earlier,
the  Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifia del  Mar  highway  is  the  only  project  to  have  been  tendered
successfully using the Least Present Value of Revenue method. The last segment of the Route 5
highway, Santiago-Talca, was tendered  after the Santiago-Valaparaiso-Vifia del  Mar highway.
However, MOP used a fixed period concession mechanism to award this project.
Table 4.2 shows some economic parameters of each concession. Average tolls per kilometre vary
between US$0.02 to US$0.03 for Route 5 projects. Other road projects are shorter and generally
have a higher toll per kilometre. It can also be seen that the government has used transfers and
subsidies extensively. This was necessary in order to produce reasonable and consistent toll rates
across concessions. Also, as mentioned earlier, in the most recent concessions, when two or more
companies offered the minimum toll, ties were resolved according to the highest payment offered to
the State. In many cases, ties did occur and therefore there are several concessions that  were
awarded according to this rule. These transfers are paid (by sponsors, not the concession firm) the
first year of full operation of the infrastructure and constitute an extra one-time payment to the
State, which is then deposited in an Infrastructure Fund.
The aggregate net transfers from the above subsidies and payments are favourable to the State. For
example, if one considers only the payments implied by the data in Table 4.2, the net present value
(at a 12% discount rate) is close to US$130 million. Furthermore, if one considers the perpetual
income and payments from the periodic re-tendering of the concessions, then the net present value
increases to US$150 million. In this sense, the programme has had a favourable impact on the fiscal
balance sheet. 2"
There has been over US$250 million in foreign equity investment related to the programme. Most
of this foreign investment has come from Spain and Mexico. Table 4.3 shows the consortiums that
have won each project and the origin of partner companies. Most of the successful companies have
been Chilean, with the exception of several Spanish and Mexican firms and-in  the case of the
latest concession tendered-a  Brazilian firm. One Canadian firm is also part of the consortium that
was recently awarded the AMB Airport concession.
Other international firms that have been involved in one of the unsuccessful bidding consortiums
include: Fluor Daniels of the USA, Dragados, FCC, Cubiertas y Entrecanales from Spain, ICA,
GMD from Mexico, Transroute, GTM, and  Bouygues from France, Strirling from the United
Kingdom, and Bilfinger Berger and De Zublin from Germany.
21 However,  this does not consider  the potential  liabilities  created  by the minimum  income  guarantees  that will be
discussed  below.
265  Uncertainty,  opportunistic  behaviour  and  government  guarantees 22
Uncertainty  is an important  issue  in any  concession  contract,  especially  if it lasts for decades.  In the
case of roads and tunnels, the biggest  source of uncertainty  is future traffic levels.  In turn, these
traffic  variations  directly  impact  the revenue  stream  of the concessionaire.
As noted  in EFG (1996,  1997a),  traffic  levels  are notoriously  difficult  to predict.  They  cite the case
of some  public  Chilean  toll roads where  yearly  traffic  growth  rates  varied  from as high as 21.5%  to
as low as 2.9% between  the 1987  and 1995.  Furthermore,  these variations  occurred  in a period of
relative  political  and economic  stability,  and where the highways  in question  had been tolled for
decades.  With this volatility  in the best of times,  predicting  traffic flows far into the future, or in
more  unstable  settings,  is clearly  an imprecise  endeavour.
There are many  experiences  where  initial  traffic  projections  turned  out to be optimistic.  In Mexico
for example,  ex-post  traffic levels  were on average  only 68% of the level initially  estimated  (and
guaranteed)  by the government. 23 Only in 5 of 32 concessions  were traffic  levels above the initial
projections,  and in 16 they were below 50% of these estimates.  In the case of the Ml project in
Hungary,  traffic levels were below 50% of initial projections,  and in the case of the Dulles
Greenway  project in Virginia,  USA, initial traffic levels were about a third of expected levels
(Fishbein  and Babbar  (1996)).  Ex-post  traffic  levels above  original  estimates  are also common.
Besides  the usual difficulties  encountered  in estimating  traffic growth  trends, when tolls are first
introduced  there is the added difficulty  of gauging  the reaction  to the toll among  users  or, in more
technical jargon, the  price  elasticity of  demand. Traffic engineers have developed very
sophisticated  tools for estimating  these elasticities,  even when users have never confronted  real
tolls for the use of the infrastructure.  However,  these estimates  may not be very reliable,  not just
because of data problems or the inference  difficulties encountered  with such estimates.  There
may be some cases where a toll road presents a  strategic opportunity for some organised
groups. 24
In Chile,  of the projects currently  in full service,  the one that has faced the most difficulties  is the
El Melon  Tunnel,  partly because  in this particular  case there is a very good substitute.  The tunnel
has to compete  with the old route that goes over the mountain,  and which  increases  travel  time by
about thirty to ninety minutes depending  on the vehicle's size and weight. Due to the tendering
22 In the case of Chile, EFG were the first to recognise the importance of uncertainty-especially  traffic risk-for
private toll roads. Some of their ideas are presented in this and the next sections. However, readers are encouraged
to consult their articles (see also Tirole (1997)) for a fuller account of some of these topics.
23 This summary and data from the Mexican experience are taken from G6mez-Ibafiez (1999).  See also G6mez-
Ibafiez y Meyer (1993) for an analysis of other world experiences, including the early Mexican experience.
24  Whereas a bus or trucking lobby may have reacted passively to an increase in fuel prices in the past-perhaps
because it was perceived that they had no power to influence that decision-they  may have more negotiating power
to pressure  a concessionaire to lower the toll of a newly  constructed road. Their power resides in their ability to
boycott the road if there are good free alternative routes.
27mechanism  described earlier,  tolls were  set  at inefficiently high  levels, producing important
traffic  diversions.  This  was especially  so for trucks  and  buses who-organised  around  their
respective trade associations-formally  boycotted the tunnel until the concessionaire was forced
to reduced tolls.
One recommendation then for reducing the above problem, and to reduce traffic risk in general,
would be to avoid building toll roads where convenient free alternative freeways are available,
unless the saturation of the existing freeway implies that there is little risk of traffic diversion. A
second recommendation is to allow downward toll flexibility in order for the concessionaire to
adjust quickly to lower than expected traffic flows.
The benefits of downward pricing flexibility can be illustrated by two examples in Chile. In the
North Access to Concepcion, the concessionaire reduced tolls for 2 or more axled vehicles at the
end of  1998. Traffic in this  category increased by  40%. In  the case of La Madera Road, the
concessionaire offered a  free fuel coupon  (valued approximately at US$7  and representing  a
reduction of less than 50% of the toll) for trucks with more than two axles that travelled without
cargo. Traffic in this category increased by 100%.
In Chile, most projects enjoy a near monopoly as far as road traffic is concerned. Also, tolls are set
as maximum values, which can be reduced if the concessionaire so wishes. In spite of this, it
became evident early in the concession process that if firms were made to assume all traffic risks
they would not be able to secure the needed finance. Financial institutions were not willing to fund
projects unless the government provided some form of guarantee.
In addition to traffic risk, a concessionaire faces what may be called "regulatory or policy" risk. 25
Infrastructure investments have the characteristics of being sunk, in the sense that once they are
built they cannot be dismantled or sold and the resources transferred to an alternative economic use.
This opens the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the government. For example, once a road
is built a  government could unilaterally demand a decrease in toll levels. 26 The concessionaire
cannot threaten to "close  the  shop"  and transfer the assets to  another economic activity. The
road-once  built-is  an irreversible investment. Knowing that they may be subject to such ex-post
expropriatory behaviour, private investors might not be willing to invest in the programme.
In Chile, ex-post tariff changes by the government are not the most important factor contributing to
"regulatory or policy" risk. Tolls, and their indexing formula, were set in the concession contract
and the concessionaire has legal protection against such unilateral changes. However, it was much
more difficult to guarantee that the government would not change its transport policy. As discussed
above, in Chile alternative freeways are not required for toll roads to be built, and for the most part,
existing projects do not have convenient free alternative routes. However, nothing prevents the
25 This was  also  noted earlier  by EFG  (1996, 1997a).
26 The failure  of governments  to increase  tariffs according  to previously  agreed levels,  or unilaterally  decreasing
tariffs,  is quite  common.  It has  happened  in Hungary,  Argentina,  Thailand  and France,  to mention  a few  cases.
28government from building such alternative routes in the future, thus siphoning off some of the
traffic from the concession. It would be nearly impossible for a government to commit-even  when
it truly wanted to-to  ensuring that no such policy change would occur.
The traditional solution to  overcome the  obstacles that traffic  and  regulatory risk pose  for a
concession programme is to give government income, traffic or debt guarantees. The guarantee
scheme adopted in Chile is discussed next.
5.1  Minimum  Income  Guarantees
There are variations to the minimum income guarantee scheme across concessions. The first two
concessions  (El  Melon  Tunnel  and  the  Madera  Road)  have  actual  physical  traffic  volume
guarantees. Subsequent concession contracts express the guarantee as a minimum income level. If
different types of traffic (cars, buses and trucks) pay different tolls, then it may make a difference
which approach is taken. 27 Since the original objective of the guarantee scheme in Chile was to
facilitate concessionaires' access to the financial market, a minimum income guarantee seemed
preferable.
Before the bidding stage, MOP sets the total income level it will guarantee for the duration of the
concession. This is set to a level equivalent to 70% of the estimated official cost of the project.
Except for the first concessions tendered, MOP now gives bidders the flexibility to choose the time
profile of the yearly guarantee within a band contained in the Bidding Documents. The bands are
set with reference to the expected growth in traffic levels and usually have a maximum of 80% to
85% of expected yearly income as a ceiling.
Bidders choose yearly income guarantees subject to the constraint that the present value of the
chosen guarantee is equal to the total set by MOP. In other words, each bidder chooses the yearly




p = the discount rate (set in the bidding documents).
(I + OC + MC) = the official net present value of the concession. This corresponds to the initial
estimate by MOP of the investment, operating expenditure and maintenance cost over the life of the
concession.
If in a given year income levels fall below the minimum income set for that year, the government
pays the concessionaire  the shortfall in revenues.
27 If the contract guarantees  a minimum  total traffic level, then changes in the composition  of traffic will affect
income  flows  but would  be irrelevant  to the guarantee  scheme.
29It is interesting to note that most bidders have opted for a time profile of income guarantees that is
heavily weighted to the present. That is, they chose the maximum of the band for the first period of
the concession and then drop to the lower end of the band for the remainder. Bidders seem to be
more concerned about short-term rather than long term traffic uncertainty. Alternatively, this may
be a result of the debt structure of these firms. To date, domestic commercial banks have provided
most of the funds and these credits are usually of relatively short maturity. In order to extend these
credits, banks may have forced firms to bid high guarantee levels in the early part of a concession. 2"
The 70% parameter of the minimum income guarantee was chosen based on the average gearing
ratios of concession firms. Debt is approximately 70% of assets in these companies. Therefore,
implicitly the minimum income guarantee is designed so that revenues are sufficient to cover debt
repayment. In essence, the scheme is a debt guarantee that benefits creditors. 29 The decision to
apply this guarantee was based on an assessment that without it, lending institutions would not
finance the infrastructure projects.
5.2  The  Revenue  Sharing  Scheme
As a counter balance to the minimum income guarantee, a concessionaire must share 50% of the
revenues obtained if traffic levels are consistently above estimated levels. This revenue sharing rule
is triggered when the accumulated revenues pass a threshold level set at the beginning of the
concession. The threshold level is set as that level of revenues beyond which the concessionaire
would earn a  rate of return on invested capital above 15%. It  is estimated based  on expected
investment levels and costs at the time  the project is tendered. Fornally,  the revenue sharing
mechanism is triggered in the first month (S) after the following conditions holds:
IN,  = RSTL
i=  (1 +±p
where
IN, = the income level in month i.
p = the discount rate of 1.1715% (equivalent to an annualised rate of 15%).
RSTL = Revenue sharing threshold level set before the concession is tendered.
Once in effect, the concessionaire must give the government:
RS,  =  0.5 *IN,  fort  = SX......M
2B Eduardo Engel has noted that another possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the discount rate set by
MOP for discounting the guarantees was too high. If this is true then investors have the incentive to cash in on the
guarantee as early as possible.
29 Eduardo Engel has pointed out that since the amount of revenue guaranteed is a function of the official-as
opposed to ex-post real-costs  of the project, firms have an incentive to pressure the authorities to overestimate
these costs. If costs are overestimated, part of the revenue guarantee will cover equity capital as well.
30The first  concessions had  a  different revenue sharing mechanism. The El  Melon Tunnel, for
example, has  a  yearly maximum traffic  ceiling which  is  symmetric to  the minimum traffic
guarantee  set  for  this  concession.  If  traffic  volumes  are  above  this  maximum  level,  the
concessionaire  must share 30% of its additional income that year with the government. The Access
Road to the AMB airport has a similar mechanism, but it is based on a yearly income threshold
rather than traffic volume.
Most of the other early concessions, however, have a profit sharing scheme based on a complicated
calculation of yearly profits. This earlier scheme has been criticised by EFG(1997a) for being
overly complex and thus making it more difficult for firms to evaluate the projects and prepare
bids. In  addition, profits  are not  easily  measurable, making  the process  less transparent and
requiring sophisticated monitoring  by  the authorities. Furthermore, the  original profit sharing
mechanism may have given bidders an incentive to over-invest, an effect analogous to the Averech-
Johnson effect in the utility regulation literature (Averech and Johnson (1962)).
Minimum income guarantees and the revenue sharing mechanism serve to reduce income variance,
as illustrated by the diagram below (Figure 5.  1). For simplicity, assume that traffic uncertainty can
be  characterised by  a  simple probabilistic  density function.  The minimum  income  guarantee
truncates this distribution by removing the risk for the concessionaire associated with very low
effective traffic levels, while the revenue sharing mechanism removes the events associated with
very high traffic levels.
Figure 5.1  Traffic probability density and variance reduction
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31However, it is important to note that  in the latest concessions both effects are not  symmetric.
Income guarantees are based on yearly traffic levels while revenue sharing depends on accumulated
traffic levels. One consequence of this asymmetry is that while income guarantees could be made
effective any year that traffic levels fall significantly, revenue sharing will not occur until far into
the future. From a public finance point of view then, there is a bias to the guarantee side of the
scheme during the early stages of the programme.
The original idea of the revenue or profit sharing schemes was to compensate for the free income
guarantees that were being provided to the concessionaire. Minimum income guarantees and the
corresponding revenue sharing scheme have been optional. In the case of the two concessions
tendered by a Least Present Value of Revenue scheme there was no revenue sharing rule. Instead,
the concessionaire had to pay a yearly fee if he chose to have the minimum income guarantee. In
other words, the revenue sharing scheme was replaced by a direct price ('premium') for the income
insurance. For example, in the Santiago-Valaparaiso-Vifna  del Mar concession, there was a yearly
charge equivalent to 0.75% of the outstanding value of the guarantees.
5.3  Income  guarantees  in practice
Table 5.1 shows traffic levels, income levels and guarantee levels for the different concessions in
operation to  date. Due to  the changing nature of the guarantee design described above, some
projects have an income guarantee mechanism while others have a traffic guarantee mechanism. 30
In most cases, traffic or income levels are well above the guaranteed levels. The exception is the
Nogales-Puchuncavi Road. Minimum income guarantees were triggered in 1997 and  1998. This
situation is due to the unusual history of this project. When it was tendered, bidders had to choose
between three construction options, each of which had a corresponding income guarantee schedule.
The winning bidder chose the most expensive option, which had the highest level of guarantees.
However,  it  was  unlikely  that  traffic  demand  would  respond  significantly  to  the  quality
improvement implied by that option. Therefore, although traffic levels have been similar to those
originally projected, income guarantee levels are relatively higher than in other concessions. As
traffic grows during the next few years, the payments of minimum income guarantees in this
particular concession are expected to cease.
In the case of the Access Road to the AMB Airport (the international airport in Santiago) traffic
levels were so high in  1998, that they triggered a revenue sharing clause. That year, 30% of all
income above 77,143 UF was transferred to the government. Something similar happened for the El
Melon Tunnel, which had to pay 2,838 UF in 1997.
The net result for 1998 is a payment of 1,083 UF on behalf of the government for minimum income
or traffic guarantees, or about US$35,000.
30 There  are a few  more projects  currently  in partial or provisional  operation.  However,  since  the minimum  income
or traffic guarantees  are only applicable  when a concession  is in full operation  these projects  are not included  in
Table 5.1.
32The case of El Melon Tunnel deserves some comment. As mentioned earlier, the concessionaire
has faced some financial problems due to traffic diversion. However, this would seem to contradict
the figures in Table 5.1, which show a very high usage level for this project since 1997. In fact, a
revenue sharing clause was activated in 1997. This paradox is explained by the peculiar nature of
the traffic guarantee in this concession. It guarantees the total traffic levels using the tunnel plus the
altemative route over the mountain. Therefore, a high traffic volune is consistent with low usage of
the tunnel. This minimum traffic guarantee has not provided a real protection to the concessionaire.
Needless to say, this is the only concession with such a mechanism.
33Table 5.1 Income, traffic and guarantees for projects in full operation
Project  Year  Income  Minimum  Traffic  Minimum  Payments by
(UF)  Income  (vehicles or  Traffic  government'
Guarantee  passengers)  Guarantee  (UF)
(UF)
El Melon Tunel  1997  164,475  1,102,137  762,000  -2,838
1998  174,720  1,251,648  769,500
Nogales-Puchuncavi Road  1997  5,927  7,125  ---  1,198
1998  39,306  42,100  594,322  ---  2,794
Santiago-San Antonio Highway  1997  355,402  ---  3,913,131
1998  523,387  453,440  6,486,136
Access to AMB airport  1997  70,365  4,137,640
1998  82,846  40,818  4,594,894  ---  -1,711
La Madera Road  1997  66,257  ---  369,356  221,000
1998  73,846  ---  414,182  228,000
Airport Diego Aracena of Iquique  1997  26,797  16,315  240,429
1998  39,982  16,968  340,018
Airport El Tepual of Puerto Montt  1997  17,536  ---  89,579  ---
1998  51,731  21,734  246,373
Notes:  The Unidad  de  Fomento (UF) is an  indexed monetary unit used in  contracts. In December  1998, it corresponded to
$14,685.39 in Chilean pesos, or US$ 31.00 at the prevailing exchange rate. For airport concessions the number of users corresponds
to passengers, while for roads and highways it is the number of vehicles. Some concessions were not in full operation and therefore
the minimum income or traffic guarantee was not applicable.
a  Negative payments indicate a transfer from the concessionaire to the governnent  as a result of a revenue sharing clause. The
figures in the column do not include subsidies or transfers determined at the beginning of the concession. They are only due to
minimum income guarantees or revenue sharing arrangements.
345.4  The  fiscal  consequences  of minimum  income  guarantees
As stated earlier,  income guarantees  were necessary  in order to attract  private investment  to the
sector.  By reducing  traffic  and policy  risk,  they also serve  to lower  the risk  premium  used by firms
in evaluating  the project.
However,  many authors  have pointed  out the potential  risks associated  with these guarantees."  As
seen in the previous  section, the government  is already paying some amount of guarantees.  If
current  traffic  trends do not change,  these payments  are expected  to disappear  in the near future.
However,  from a fiscal perspective,  the real danger  is a simultaneous  downturn  in usage across  a
multitude  of concessions.  If traffic levels across different  concessions  are highly correlated-as
they would  be if they are sensitive  to the general  economic  business  cycle-then  a recession  could
trigger these guarantees  over a wide range of contracts,  forcing  up fiscal expenditure  just when
government  finances  are least  able  to afford  it.
Compounding  the above  problem  is the fact  that these  contingent  liabilities  are generally  not  treated
as such  by current  fiscal  accounting  practices.  In most cases,  no budgetary  provisions  are made for
the eventuality  that the government  will have  to pay the guarantees.  From a budgetary  perspective,
guarantees  are ignored  until they are made effective,  after which  payments  are recorded  as current
expenditure.
Due to its importance,  MOP commissioned  a study to address the fiscal issues related to the
minimum income guarantees.  The basic objective of the study was to determine  the value of
these contingent  liabilities  and whether  budgetary  provisions were necessary  to cover expected
future  payments.  Using MOP's traffic forecast  models, Monte  Carlo analysis  found that the 70%
guarantee level is sufficiently low so that only a very unlikely event would simultaneously
trigger a substantial number of guarantees. Therefore,  provisions were not considered to be
necessary at that moment. However,  ongoing research is being undertaken to implement  the
contingent liability valuation method for MOP and to continuously monitor the fiscal risks
associated  with the minimum  income  guarantees.
Furthermore,  as noted earlier,  the programme  in Chile has so far generated  a positive cash flow
to  the government.  The proceeds deposited in the Investment Fund provide some form of
provision  for future  minimum  income  guarantee  payments.
Another  problem with income guarantees  is that if they are designed-as  in Chile-to  be a debt
guarantee, then creditors may have a  reduced incentive to  monitor the  operations of  the
concession firm. EFG (1997a) also argue that income guarantees remove one of the main
advantages of private infrastructure  provision, namely the effective screening by the private
sector of 'white elephant' projects. These are projects that are not socially  justified based on
31 See Mody and Patro (1996),  Engel, Fisher and Galetovic (1997c) and other studies in Irwin, Klein, Perry and
Thobani (1997).
35expected demand projections  but  are  still promoted  for political,  prestige  or  special  interest
reasons. If guarantees are given, private investors may not scrutinise the viability of the project
as carefully as they would otherwise. This argument would indicate that-if  guarantees are to be
given-they  should cover less than 100% of the investment and operating cost of the project. In
Chile, because income representing only up to 70% of the value of investments is insured, and
this is approximately equal to the value of debt, equity investments effectively have little or no
guarantees and therefore sponsoring firms have full incentives to evaluate the project correctly.
5.5  Least  Present  Value of Revenue  mechanism
Engel, Fisher and Galetovic argue in a series of articles that many of the problems that plague
road  concessions-and  which  give  rise  to  the  pressure  faced  by  governments  to  give
guarantees-are  due to the fixed term nature of the traditional  franchising contracts. 32 One of
their main insights has been to note that the economic uncertainty posed by traffic risk can be
substantially reduced by a state contingent contract (ie. a contract whose duration is a function of
the future demand level encountered).
As  was  mentioned  earlier,  income  uncertainty  may  force  governments  to  grant  income
guarantees in order to  implement a successful concession programme. Income uncertainty will
also increase the risk premium required by equity investors. EFG (1996) estimate that in Chile
the added risk premium imposed by fixed term concession contracts may be 33% of investment
costs on average (ranging from 16% to 67%).
Uncertainty may also lead to what is called the 'winner's  curse'. With uncertainty, bidders form
an opinion ('estimate')  of the future evolution of a key variable, such as the traffic flow. Even if
this estimate is unbiased on average, each will have a slightly different outlook on the future. In
this  situation,  if  bidders  bid  naively  the  winner  is  the  agent who  is  most  optimistic-and
therefore biased-with  respect to the future. The winner will therefore find that the concession is
ex-post unprofitable. On the other hand, if bidders are aware of this phenomenon, taking this
factor into account when formulating their bids may make them conservative in their bidding
strategy. They will compensate the risk of the winner's  curse by increasing their bids, with the
consequence that tolls will be higher than what would have been possible otherwise.
Perhaps  the  most  important  consequence  of  the  demand  uncertainty  created by  fixed term
contracts is the higher probability that the contract will need to be renegotiated ex-post. In fact,
Engel, Fisher and Galetovic show that with a fixed term  contract a concessionaire will make
losses under  some  states of nature  (ie. low  demand outcomes).  Once a  concessionaire is  in
financial distress it may be very difficult for a government to resist  a re-negotiation process.
There are countless experiences around the world where  unsuccessful  road concessions  have
32 See  EFG (1996, 1997a,  1997b,  1997c,  1997d,  1998)  and Tirole  (1997).
36been  bailed  out  by  governments, the  case of  Mexico being  a  recent  example. Besides  the
detrimental effect to tax-payers and road users, franchise renegotiations should be avoided due to
the  signal  it  sends  to  bidders  of  future  contracts.  If  bidders  know  that  contracts  can  be
renegotiated,  the  winner  may  be  the  firm  with  the  highest  comparative  advantage  in
renegotiations, rather than the most efficient and productive firm. 33
In order to  avoid some  of the problems posed by  fixed term  concessions, Engel, Fisher and
Galetovic  propose  the  'Least  Present  Value  of  Revenue'  auction  (LPVR). 34 The  bidding
variable-instead  of toll  levels or  some other conventional variable-is  the present value  of
revenue throughout the life of the concession that firms are willing to accept to undertake the
project.  The firm  that  bids  the  lowest  present  value  of  revenue  wins.  The  duration of  the
concession is then flexible and depends  on the effective traffic  levels encountered. Once the
concessionaire has received-in  present value terms-the  amount that he bid, the concession
ends  and the  infrastructure reverts to  public  ownership. If  real traffic  levels  are lower  than
expected, the duration of the concession is extended automatically, while if traffic is higher than
expected the opposite occurs. Therefore, income uncertainty due to traffic variations is to a large
extent eliminated for the concessionaire.
Besides reducing income  uncertainty, the LPVR auction has  other advantages.  It reduces the
problems and potential conflicts related to the early termination of a concession. In a thirty year
contract, it is difficult to predict what will happen far into the future. In many cases, excessive
traffic growth or other events call for an expansion of the original project. In spite of the special
provision for these events included in some contracts, it would be optimal to cancel the original
contract  and  re-tender  the  concession  with  the  extended  projects,  rather  than  negotiate the
additional  investments  with  the  existing  concessionaire.  However,  the  difficulty  lies  in
calculating the compensation that must be given to the concessionaire in order to terminate the
contract.  The  forgone  future  income  stream  must  be  estimated,  giving  rise  to  potentially
contentious and protracted conflicts and legal battles. The LPVR auction reduces this problem
substantially by just giving the concessionaire the difference between what he originally bid and
what  he  has  earned  already. 35 This  may  increase the  credibility  of  a  governent  threat  to
terminate the contract if the concessionaire attempts to opportunistically renegotiate the contract,
thereby reducing the potential problems related to "low balling."
3  As mentioned  earlier,  in Chile many  concessions  have  been  renegotiated.  However,  the cause  has been the need  to
change  original  designs  or to provide  for additional  investments,  rather  than to bail out concessionaires  in financial
distress.  As noted by EFG  (I 997a),  this may still  send a harmfiul  signal  to potential  bidders.
3  The idea of tendering  a contract using a minimum  least total revenue  mechanism  was first suggested  by Alvaro
Gonzalez  of MOP.  This is a special  case of the LPVR  auction,  specifically,  when  revenue  flows are not discounted.
3  There is a small adjustment to this simple procedure  due to the maintenance  and operating costs that the
concessionaire  saves by  early termination of the  contract. In the  case of roads these are relatively minor
expenditures  compared  to construction  costs and can in principle  be estimated  by audits or another mechanism.
However,  in sectors  other  than roads,  where operating  and maintenance  expenditures  are a significant  proportion  of
investments,  the LPVR  auction may  not be as useful.
37More generally, the LPVR auction generates a public signal of the value that the concessionaire
places on the contract. This facilitates the monitoring by third parties of ex-post negotiations and
possible  compensations  to  the  concessionaire,  making  the  process  more  accountable  and
transparent.
Another important characteristic of the LPVR mechanism is that tolls can be adjusted without
having to negotiate new terns  with the concessionaire. If tolls are deemed too high or low, the
authorities could change them without affecting the concessionaire's expected income stream and
without engaging in a potentially protracted negotiation process. As stressed in EFG (1997a), this
flexibility  may  be  important  in  urban  road  concessions  where  it  may  be  very  difficult  to
determine the optimal tariff ex-ante, especially during congestion periods.
The LPVR mechanism also has its drawbacks. It may lower the incentive of concessionaires to
make demand enhancing investments, such as quality improvements. The increase in demand
from these expenditures results in an earlier termination for the contract, with little benefit to th,
concessionaire. 36 However, there are other remedies for this problem (see Tirole (1997)). Perhaps
a  more  important difficulty  is  that  the  LPVR  auction  does  not  resolve  possible  cash  flow
problems that a concessionaire may face when traffic levels drops. This issue will be discussed
below in relation to the Costanera Norte project.
In Chile, two projects have been tendered using the LPVR mechanism. Because of the novelty of
the mechanism involved, these cases will be briefly reviewed next. First, however, it must be
said that-knowingly  or not-the  UK was the first to apply a variable length concession with an
LPVR flavour in the Severn Trent and Dartford Bridge concessions.3' The social benefits of suchI
a franchise can now be seen by the fact that-due  to the high traffic levels-the  concession for
the Severn Trent Bridge will finish many years earlier than originally envisaged.
5.5.1 The Santiago-Valparaiso-Vifna  del Mar  concession 3"
The Santiago-Valparaiso-Vinia  del Mar highway,  also known as Route 68, is one of the main
links between Santiago (the capital) and the coast. The project contemplated the construction of
three tunnels and  the  extension or  improvement  of much of  the  130 kilometres  of  existing,
infrastructure.
It was estimated that there was a high probability that by 2010, a substantial expansion of the
route would be needed again to accommodate higher traffic levels. Therefore, the use of a LPVR
36 Early  termination  of the contract  would  save  the concessionaire  the additional  maintenance  and operation  costs
that  would  have  been  incurred  during  the  original  period.  But  these  are  usually  small.
3  We  thank  Eduardo  Engel  for having  pointed  this  out to us.  See  also  Fishbein  and Babbar  (1996)  for  a description
of  the  Dartford  Crossing.  See  Marshall  (1989)  for  a description  of the  financial  structure  of the Second  Severn  Trent
Crossing.  From  this  later  article  it is clear  that  the  agents  involved  in the  United  Kingdom  had  a clear  understanding
of  the  benefits  of a variable  length  concession  in terms  of reducing  revenue  uncertainty.
See Hinojosa  (1998).
38mechanism seemed particularly useful in this case in order to have the option of terminating the
concession early and tendering a new project.
Although the project was tendered using the LPVR mechanism, there is a ceiling of 25 years on
the duration of the  concession. 39 Five  consortiums presented a  bid, but  only  four passed the
technical evaluation stage. The financial bids for each of the qualified firms are shown in Table
5.2.  The consortium  Rutas  del Pacifico  won the  competition  with  a  Total  Revenue  of  the
Concession (TRC) bid of US$381 million. The official cost of the project according to MOP was
US$340 million in net present value terms.
Table 5.2 Total revenues bid for the Santiago-Valparaiso-Vinla  del Mar concession
Firm  Total Revenue of the Concession Bid
(US$ Millions)
CICASA Chile  452
ECORUTAS  389
Rutas del Pacifico  381
Autopistas de Peajes SA  442
The concession ends the month that the following condition is met (unless the concession has
already lasted 25 years, in which case it ends automatically):
PVI  2TRC
where
TRC = Total revenue of the concession of the winning firm, or 11,938,207 UF (US$ 381 million)
in this case.
PVI,,, =  Present value of monthly income of the concessionaire, which is calculated as:
in  =XjIN,
i=rl(I  +rj  )12
j=1
with
IN, = revenues in month i expressed in Unidades de Fomento (UF) and including any payment of
minimum income guarantees if applicable.
r. =discount rate for month j.
Crucial to the above calculation is the rate used to discount future income flows. 40 MOP gave
bidders a choice of a variable or fixed real interest rate. The fixed rate was set in the bidding
39Based on official  cost  and traffic estimates,  the concession  is expected  to last approximately  17  years.
40 It is important  for the authorities  correctly  set  the value  of the discount  rate  so that it reflects  the true cost  of
capital  of bidders.  On this issue  see Gonzalez,  Hinojosa  and Munoz  (1999)  and the original  EFG  articles.
39documents as a risk free rate of  6.5% plus a risk premium  of 4%,  giving a total  real rate of
10.5%. The variable rate was set as the monthly average real risk free rate of the financial system
in monthj,  plus a 4% risk premium. Table 5.3 shows that only one bidder declared a preference
for the variable rate, while the winner opted for a fixed rate.
Table 5.3 Type of discount rate chosen by each bidder
Firm  Type of discount rate
CICASA Chile  fixed
ECORUTAS  variable
Rutas del Pacifico  fixed
Autopistas de Peajes SA  fixed
As was mentioned earlier, minimum income guarantees were offered as an option at a price of
0.75% of the value of the outstanding guarantees. It is interesting to note that two of the four
bidders-including  the winner-did  not request the guarantees (see Table 5.4). This is suggestive
of the advantages of the LPVR auction in-lowering income uncertainty and therefore reducing
the need to grant guarantees.
Table 5.4 Minimum income guarantee requests
Firm  Request of minimum income guarantee
CICASA Chile  yes
ECORUTAS  yes
Rutas del Pacifico  no
Autopistas de Peajes SA  no
Finally, the government has the option of terminating the concession early after 12 years if it
considers that  traffic growth justifies  the development of a  new project.  If the concession is
terminated early in month m, the concessionaire will be compensated according to the following
formula:
C.
COMP =TRC  - P  VI  -_  tij1  *A
(+ r)
where
COMP = future value of the required compensation in Unidades de Fomento (UF).
C; = estimated operating and maintenance cost in month i.
s = estimated end of the concession if early termination is not applied.
r = discount rate of 10.5%.
A = forward value factor given by,
11(I + t,
j=l
40where tj is the fixed or variable discount rate chosen by the concession.a  ire.
The  simplicity  of  the  above  formula  for  terminating  the  contract  is  one  of  the  important
advantages of the LPVR mechanism. Potential disputes are limited to the relativelv minor issue
of estimating the present val-e of operating and maintcenance  costs
5.5.2 The Costanera  Norte Concession
Late last year the first urban concession was tendered using the LPVR auction mechanism.4 It
considered the construction of a 39 kilometre east-west corridor to reduce Santiago's  endemic
congestion problems. It  was also  intended  to  be the project  that  would  set the  standard for
electronic metering technology in the country. Most of the features of the Santiago-Valparaiso-
Vinia  del Mar tendering mechanism described above were also included in the Costanera Norte
project. However, one novel feature of the tendering was the inclusion of a  foreign exchange
guarantee, something that had not been necessary in previous concessions.
The  Costanera Norte  is a  very  complex project.  Institutionally,  there  are many  government
bodies with jurisdiction over some aspect of the concession. Moreover, being an urban project,
numerous environmental, technical, and legal issues had to be resolved. Opposition from affected
parties had also been greater than for previous concessions.  After more than three years  and
several postponements, it was finally tendered  late  last year. Unfoirtunately, of the eight pre-
qualified bidders only one-the  French Bouygues-Transroute Consortium-presented  an offer.
Furthernore,  this offer was disqualified because the guarantee bond offered by the bidder was
below the level established in the bidding documents.
There  are  several  explanations  for  the  above  result.  The  internaional  financial  crisis  was
probably a factor in explaining the low turnout. However, private sector sources also point to the
risky nature of the project-with  grassroots opposition, new untested electronic tolling and low
income guarantees-as  the reason behind their decision not to participate.
The bidding documents included an optional minimum income guarantee similar to the Santiago-
Valparaiso-Vifia del Mar highway. However, construction costs in the Costanera Norte project
were perceived to be higher than the official estimate made by MOP. Therefore, the minimum
income guarantees would cover debts equivalent to a lower share of the total cost of the project
than the 70% target set by MOP. Industry sources indicated that the guarantees would only cover
about 60% of their expected costs and therefore creditors would only be willing to finance this
amount. Equity investors were not willing to provide the 40% difference.
There was an added commercial risk involved in this project. Electronic tolling was considered
to be  the only feasible charging method in the crowded urban setting of the Costanera Norte
41 See EFG (1997a) for a proposal specifically designed for urban road concessions and some insights relating to the
Costanera Norte project.
41project.  Since electronic tolling  was untested in  the country, there  was uncertainty as to  the
success in collecting charges to users. The minimum income guarantees came into effect onlv if
'real'  traffic  flows decreased below  the  guaranteed level,  independent of the  success of  the
concessionaire in collecting the charges from motorists. The government eventually agreed to
give some form of commercial risk  guarantee. This took the  form of an  85% toll collection
guarantee. However, unlike the minimum income guarantees, these were not actual payments
that the government would make to the concessionaire. Rather, a shortfall in collection success
would be translated into a longer concession period, in an analogous fashion to the effect thlat
lower traffic has under a LPVR contract.
Participants, however, were not convinced of the merits of this scheme for two reasons. Cne
sticking point was that the collection guarantee only came into effect if the concessionaire has
exhausted the legal options for collecting tolls through the judicial system. However, many finns
were concerned that the number of non-payers may have swamped the capacity of Santiago's
court system, thereby rendering the guarantee useless. Not  many cases would reach the final
stages where the guarantees could be invoked. However, from the governments point of view it
was difficult to design the guarantee otherwise without creating a moral hazard problem related
to toll collection.
Another objection posed by firms was the fact that a term extension did not solve the medium
term liquidity problems that  a  concessionaire may face. The  conventional  income  guarantee
solves this  problem because  the government  makes  real transfers  to  the firm.  However,  an
extension of the concession period does not. Therefore, although the 'asset'  value of the contract
(the LPVR) may be sufficiently high, cash flow problems may force the concessionaire into debt
service problems and possibly liquidation if he cannot reschedule his debts with creditors during
the interim period.
Both Klein (1997) and Tirole (1997) have noted the cash flow problem in relation to the LPV'R
method. In particular, Tirole argues that the LPVR method must be complemented by financial
innovations that  would  give  concessionaires  more  flexibility  in  their  debt payments.  Fixed
maturity finance is not adequate for LPVR type arrangements.
This is not an argument against an LPVR auction method. EFG have proven that for a given
level of guarantees an LPVR type arrangement is always preferable to a fixed duration contract.
It is, however, a reason why minimum income guarantees may still be required when projects are
tendered using an LPVR method.
Minimum  income  guarantees  coupled  with  the  LPVR  tendering  mechanism  may  be  an
interesting policy combination. In this  context, guarantees act as a liquidity instrument rather
than a guarantee to subsidise losses. If traffic falls below the guaranteed level, the governmeit
makes  an income  transfer to the  firm. For the purpose  of keeping track  of the accumulated
revenues, these guarantees count as income as if they were produced by real traffic. Therefor-,
the concession terminates  earlier compared to  the  case when the  LPVR mechanism is  used
42without guarantees. The concessionaire does not benefit from the government transfer. In NPV
terms his income is the same. The government is repaid the 'loan'  when the infrastructure-and
the corresponding tolling income-reverts  back earlier to public ownership.
Another interesting aspect of the Costanera Norte experience, which sheds some light on the
potential for the LPVR auction mechanism, is that firms placed a very low value on cash flows
beyond  30 years. The expected duration of the concession under baseline projections was 30
years. 42 Therefore, lower traffic flows or low collection levels would automatically extend the
duration of the concession beyond that period. However, debriefing meetings held with potential
participants indicated that they only  evaluated the project  using a  30 year horizon, therefore
annulling  the  benefits of  the LPVR mechanism  in  reducing income  uncertainty.  Apparently
investors were not willing to consider potential cash flows that went beyond the horizon of most
existing financial instruments in Chile and in international capital markets.
The above  evidence  is  anecdotal  and  must  be  interpreted  as  such.  However,  if  the  above
hypothesis  is true, then  the LPVR mechanism may  not  be  feasiblp in  all  circumstances. In
particular, for very long and risky concessions such as the Costanera Norte project the method
may not be as promising compared to shorter concessions such as the Santiago-Valparaiso-Vinia
del Mar highway. Furthermore, there is still an issue surrounding possible cash flow problems
related to debt service when an LPVR mechanism is used. It may be that the optimal solution
could be for governments to complement this mechanism with an explicit liquidity guarantee as
discussed above. 43 Alternatively, some form of financial innovation could be encouraged in order
to provide for more flexible debt service commitments. This topic merits further research.
6  Financial  issues  and exchange  rate  guarantees
As stated in the introduction, one of the main motivations of the concession programme in Chile
was to mobilise private sector finance for infrastructure investments. There were three potential
sources of funds:
the domestic banking system;
domestic pension funds and insurance companies;
*  foreign equity or financial investors .
To date, domestic banks have provided most of the credits for the construction stage. However,
these  credits are usually  expensive and  of  short  maturity. As  the  exposure  of the  domestic
banking  system  to  infrastructure  investments  increases,  and  as  concessionaires  attempt  to
42 Increasing tolls to shorten the concession was ruled out since it would probably create important traffic
diversions. In addition, tolls have already been increased by over 50% in a previous revision of the project.
4  It must be noted that this alternative would still create some of the fiscal problems related to public guarantees that
were discussed above.
43refinance their  debts  after the construction  stage, there  will be  a  growing need to  tap other
sources of finance, especially long-term finance.
The Chilean private pension system offers an attractive source of funds. These institutions could
provide much needed long-term finance. However, pension funds are tightly regulated and in the
initial  stages  of  the  programme  these  institutions  were  legally  constrained  from  investing
infrastructure projects. In  particular,  the  lack of  investment grade rating  for  bonds or  other
financial instruments issued by concession companies was an obstacle.
In order to facilitate investments from pension funds and insurance companies-as  well as to
expedite the participation of banks-legal  changes to  financial  and  infrastructure regulations
were  introduced between  1995 and  1996. These reforms,  among other things,  increased the
lending allowances of commercial banks for infrastructure projects from 5% to  15% of capital
and reserves. In addition, they opened the door for pension funds and insurance companies to
invest  in  bonds  without  history.  As  a  result  of  these  reforms,  a  new  long-term  financial
instrument-the  Infrastructure Bond-was  created. 44
Table 6.1 Infrastructure Bonds emissions
Concession  Currency  Amount  Date of issuance  Rating'
AMB  US$ denominated  US$213 million  1999  AAA
International  bond
Airport
Route 5, Talca-  Domestic  US$ 185 million  1999  AAA
Chillan  denominated
inflation linked bond
Route 5,  Domestic  US$ 230 million  pending approval  A
Santiago Los  denominated  by financial
Vilos  inflation linked bond  regulator
Nogales  Domestic  US$ 12 million  Advance stage of
Puchuncavi  denominated  preparation
inflation  linked bond
Source: MOP
' Rating by Standard & Poor's.
To date, there have been two bond emissions, both in early 1999 (See Table 7.1). The consortium
of the AMB International Airport in Santiago was successful in placing  a dollar denominated
bond in the North American market for US$213 million. These bonds were rated as AAA by
Standard and Poor's.  Another bond issue  was successfully placed  in  the domestic market  in
February of this year. Pension funds were for the most part the purchasers of these domestic
currency financial instruments. These bonds were also rated as AAA by Standard and Poor's.
4  See Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Finance (1998).
44In spite of these innovations, there is a growing perception that the domestic financial market
may not be sufficiently large to fund, by itself, the next wave of concessions. Therefore, there is a
concerted effort to  attract foreign credit for the new projects. In  addition to  providing more
competition in the financial market, foreign funding could also force a decrease in premiums,
thereby reducing the financial costs faced by concessionaires.
However, exchange rate risk poses an  important obstacle for attracting foreign credits in  the
infrastructure  industry.  In  the  last  concession  tendered-the  Costanera  Norte  project-the
government for the first time  considered giving an exchange rate guarantee. This consisted of
denominating part  of the  minimum  income  guarantees  in  US$.  Therefore,  in  the  case of a
devaluation, the real  value  of these  guarantees  increased.  Once  again, this  mechanism only
provided cover for their foreign currency denominated debt payments, therefore foreign equity
investors still faced the risk of currency fluctuations. However, there was another mechanism
whereby part of the LPVR would be  denominated in US$.  In this case, a  devaluation would
increase this value, extending the duration of the concession automatically. A revaluation of the
currency would have the opposite effect.
An exchange rate guarantee has a similar problem to the minimum income guarantee. Both are
likely to be triggered when governnent  finances or balance of payment problems are at their
worst. The interesting aspect of the LPVR exchange rate cover, as designed in the Costanera
Norte project, is that it would not entail an actual payment by the government or users at the time
of crisis. Therefore, although it provides an exchange rate protection to investors, it would not
drain foreign reserves in times of crisis. This scheme would only have an affect on the duration
of the concession, and then only if devaluations are not compensated by revaluations during this
period.
The government is currently studying the development of a more comprehensive exchange rate
guarantee in order to facilitate the foreign funding and re-financing of infrastructure projects.
7  Monitoring  of contracts  and regulatory  institutions 45
Up to the present moment, the Ministry of Public Works has acted as the regulatory institution
that  monitors  the  concession  contracts.  However,  this  might  not  be  an  optimal  long-run
institutional arrangement.
The design of regulatory and monitoring  institutions  is an immensely important topic in  any
franchising process. These contracts  lock-in the government  and private  concessionaires in  a
relationship that lasts a very long time. It is illusory to think that the work is finished once a
project is concessioned, or to think that the provisions of the contract are enough to regulate the
firm.
45 See  EFG  (1997a)  for a longer discussion  of these and other  issues  related  to the regulation  of toll roads.
45In the first place, there is hardly any concession experience in the world --be it water, telecoms,
electricity or roads-- that does not experience some form of ex-post re-negotiation of the original
terms of the contract. In addition, political  considerations will always get in the way when it
comes to monitoring, applying fines, and terminating a contract when the concessionaire does
not meet the stipulated contract conditions.
For these reasons, it is ideal to have a regulatory agency that:
*  is politically independent from the executive power;
*  is not a promoter of the concession programme;
Although far from the ideal described above, in September 1997 a special unit was created within
the Concession Agency in MOP and specifically designed to monitor and regulate the concession
contracts.
One of the first difficulties faced by this new enforcement unit was the lack of human resources
required to monitor such a large concession programme. In addition, there was a need to generate
the technical information required to enforce the quality standards of the infrastructure during the
construction  phase.  Although  construction  companies undertake  regular  quality tests  for the
infrastructure, it was found that in certain cases this information is not passed on to MOP, nor to
other partners in the concession consortium, in a regular and timely manner.
To solve both of the above problems, regular quality audits are now undertaken by third party
engineering firms paid for by the concessionaire. This information is immediately distributed
among the various interested parties.
8  The future
There are still over US$3 billion worth of projects to be tendered. Almost half of this amount is
accounted for by the  urban road  projects,  including the re-tendering  of the  Costanera Norte
project.
In addition, MOP has been studying the possibility of extending the concession programme  to
new activities and areas. An interesting example currently being studied is the introduction of
concession type contracts for the maintenance of parts of the existing road network. The private
sector already  undertakes  maintenance activities  under  contract  from  MOP.  However,  these
contracts usually cover specific tasks and have a short duration. A concession type maintenance
arrangement would be longer and would try to exploit the full life cycle economies that could be
achieved if an agent is responsible for the state of roads for a longer time period. For example, if
a concessionaire has to maintain the quality of a piece of network for 5 years, he may find it
convenient to invest in higher quality repairs than what MOP currently demands in maintenance
46contracts  in  order  to  reduce  subsequent  costs.  Also,  a  concessionaire  may  have  superior
knowledge regarding the state of the network and have a faster reaction in repairing roads after a
harmful climatic event.
Introducing  real  tolls  to  fund  these  maintenance  concessions  is  generally  not  feasible  nor
desirable. However, the use of shadow tolls seems a promising alternative. 46 In essence, shadow
tolls are another way of providing State subsidies or funding for infrastructure projects. Instead
of a lump-sum yearly fixed transfer-as  in some of the existing Chilean toll roads-transfers  are
made based on the number of vehicle using the road. In other words, the State pays a 'toll'  for
each vehicle using the network but the user does not face this charge, hence the name 'shadow
toll'.  Nothing  prevents  linking  the  payments  to  other  variables  besides  vehicle  use.  In  a
maintenance contract, shadow tolls could be linked to measurable quality characteristics of the
road, in addition to vehicle use. 47
The  use  of  shadow  tolls-by  allowing  a  performance  related  payment  to  the
contractor-improves  the incentive properties  of maintenance contracts,  reducing the cost of
maintaining  the  infrastructure  in  good  condition.  In  addition,  it  would  allow  government
maintenance expenditures to  be less volatile through time.  Instead. of big lump-sum transfers
when capital maintenance is required, the government would make more stable yearly payments
based on the quality and use of the network. This would allow more projects to be funded with
existing  budgets,  although  provisions  must  be  made  for  the  future liabilities  that  the  State
assumes with this mechanism.
MOP  is  also  studying  the  possibility  of  extending  the  concession  programme  to  irrigation
projects.
9  Conclusions
The intention of this paper has been to present an overview of the Chilean programme and some
lessons that may be useful to other developing countries wishing to embark on a similar route.
Among the lessons extracted from the Chilean experience, we can summarise the following:
It may be advisable to try to avoid as much as possible the concessioning of roads with
convenient alternative freeways;
46 Shadow  tolls were developed  in  the United  Kingdom  and are currently  being used in eight  BOT type  road
projects.  See Highways  Agency  and Private  Finance  Panel  Executive  (1998).
4  Linking  payments  to vehicle  use may still  be desirable  in maintenance  contracts  if traffic  demand  is sensitive  to
the quality  of the road  or if maintenance  expenditure  varies with  traffic levels  using the infrastructure.  However,  in
order  to give  the right incentives,  the measurable  quality  of the road should  be central in the payment  mechanism.
47*  Choosing the  appropriate  variable to  award  a  concession is  critical.  Mechanisms  that
encourage  high  tolls  (for  example by  promoting  large  payments  to  the  State  or  short
concession  periods)  should  be  avoided.  Also,  if  a  concession  is  awarded to  the  firm
offering to  charge the lowest  toll  level, a  floor  and a  ceiling should be  placed  on the
possible bids. The first should be set to guarantee the financial viability of the concession
and the latter should be set to avoid inefficient traffic diversions. Ties between bidders at
the top or bottom end of this band should be resolved by a second variable such as the level
of transfers between the firm and the State.
v  Downward toll flexibility should be allowed in order for the concessionaire to be able to
react to unexpected low traffic flows, especially for particular categories of vehicles;
*  Special attention should be placed in the tendering mechanism, as well as in the gen-ral
incentive  structure  of  the  concession contract. Novel  mechanisms,  such as  the  LPVR
auction. may help overcome many problems faced by traditional road franchises. As the
case of the Santiago-Valaparaiso-Vifia del Mar concession shows, this  mechanism rmay
provide a useful instruument  for reducing traffic risk and obviate the need for the State to
extend income  guarantees.  Likewise, tendering  mechanisms  developed  in  Chile can be
used  to  reduce the  possibility  of  bidders  presenting  dangerously  low bids,  and  hence
jeopardise the financial stability of the concession.
*  Although the evidence is anecdotal, the case of the Costanera Norte tendering experience
may point to certain limitations to the pure LPVR mechanism. In particular, there may be a
limit to the value that investors place on the extension of a concession's duration if it goes
beyond, say, 30 years. In addition, this mechanism does not address cash flow and liquidity
problems that a concessionaire may face during an extended low traffic episode. However,
there  m.ay be  a role  for income  guarantees  to  provide  liquidity  enhancement  in  these
circumstances. In  fact,  a  minimum  income  guarantee  within  the context  of  an  LP'VR
auction is a credit enhancement instrument rather than an income support tool. Given the
clear advantages of an LPVR auction mechanism over traditional fixed duration contrac,ts,
the combination of this type of scheme with an explicit liquidity enhancement mechanism
may be a promising policy option. Alternatively, some form of financial innovation could
be encouraged in order to provide for more flexible debt service commitments.
i  If concessions are tendered by traditional methods and income guarantees are going to be
given, it is advisable for them to cover only a fraction of the expected income stream of the
concessionaire. This lowers the financial exposure of the  State as well as improves the
incentives faced by the concessionaire. -
*  Finally, efforts should be made to make contracts as complete as possible. However, more
likely  than  not,  contracts  will  need  to  be  modified  or  renegotiated  ex-post  in  ways
unforeseen when originally drafted. Therefore,  it is advisable  to  have a framework  for
48dealing with these events, including an efficient and well designed dispute resolution
mechanism,  rather than face each one in an ad-hoc  manner.
The main motivation  for the programme  in Chile  was the need to boost investment  in order  to plug
the growing  infrastructure  deficit after more than a decade  of sustained  economic  growth.  To this
end, the programme  in Chile has been a success.  To date, nearly 50% of the road infrastructure
deficit identified  initially  has already  been covered  by the concession  scheme.  The rest will be
addressed  by forthcoming  projects funded both by the private as well as the public sector. In
addition,  the programme  has generated,  in present  value  terms, net revenues  amounting  to between
US$130  million  to US$150  million  for govemment  coffers.
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